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Unfair Competition & Penal Violations
jurisdiction of the courts to issue the necessary 'decree is expressed or im-
plied. In lieu of the property forfeiture provision of section 6 of the
Sherman Act, 3 state antitrust legislation, particularly of early vintage,
provides for the forfeiture of domestic corporation charters and the rev-




State antitrust enactments present a bewildering variety of minor
variations in form. A close examination, however, reveals at least three
distinct classifications. First, legislation is expressed in terms of mo-
nopoly avoidance and the preservation of competition in the market as a
whole. This emphasis on the preservation of competition is a generality,:
since regard for the small businessman always has been an important ele-
ment in antitrust philosophy and enforcement. The second classifica-
tion pertains to the protection of the individual competitor. Here,
statutes speak of competition as that of a regularly established dealer or
even a person attempting to become a dealer. In this area, however,
there is generally no reference to the actual or potential competition in-
volved. The third classification is that 6f the unfair discrimination
statutes. The statutes in this area speak of territory-splitting and favored
dealing only in the broadest sense and leave much to be desired concern-
ing what specifically is prohibited.
W. KiELY CRONIN
Unfair Competition and Penal Violations:
Status in Ohio
Part I
He who successfully evades his legal obligations obtains a com-
petitive advantage over his law-abiding rivals.'
INTRODUCTION
Viewed Morally
When a competitor disregards either a penal or civil statute directed
at the operation of his business, his noncompliance certainly places his
competitor at a disadvantage. In principle, this is true regardless of first,
the purpose of the statute; second, whether the statute is prohibitive or
directive; and third, the financial cost incurred in observance of the
Texas, Vermont, Virginia, and Wisconsin. 4 TRADE REG. REP. 55 30201-35585.
53. 26 Stat. 210 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 6 (1958).
54. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 79, § 26 (1961).
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statute.2 Thus, statutes which promote public health, safety, or welfare,
raise revenue, or regulate competition are reducible to a single plane;
an "unlawful" advantage is gained when each is avoided. Even more ob-
vious is the fact that it is the intention of the unlawful competitor to suc-
ceed over his rival by acquiring this "unlawful" advantage.3 Professor
Callmann has succinctly stated:
[O]ne may reasonably assume that quacks who disregard license re-
quirements are not driven by a malevolent desire to endanger public
health, even though the licensing statute may have been enacted as a
means of minimizing that likelihood.4
Reasonably viewed, are there any circumstances wherein the unlawful
competitor should be allowed to retain this unlawful advantage? In a
free competitive society, both logic and justice demand that the rewards
must go to the competitor who succeeds over his rival by directing his
skills towards improving business operations in a manner not prohibited
by law. The competitor who directs his skills towards concealing penal
violations to realize a competitive advantage over his rival must be
condemned.
Present Status
The foregoing, while seemingly at least morally right, is not the
law. Factually, a competitor may violate penal laws which result in a
direct ascertainable loss to his rival for which the rival cannot collect
damages. Moreover, he cannot enjoin future violations. Paradoxically,
the only relief for the law-abiding competitor in many instances is also
1. HANDLER, TRADE REGULATION 787-88 (3d ed. 1960). The reader's attention is directed
to 2 CALLMANN, UNFAIR COMPEITrION AND TRADE-MARKS 926 (2d ed. 1950) (herein-
after cited as CALLMANN), for the most complete and comprehensive treatment that research
revealed concerning unfair competition and penal violations. Professor Callmann's ideas were
borrowed extensively and appear throughout this note. Interest regarding unfair competition
through penal violations also has been expressed in other states. See CHicAGo B.A., THE
LAWS OF ILLINOIS RELATING TO COMPETITION 143-281 (1960); N.Y.S.B.A., SECOND RE-
PORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE NEW YORK ANTITRUST LAWS 2a-21a.
See also Note, Implying Civil Remedies From Federal Regulatory Statutes, 77 HARV. L REV.
285 (1963).
2. There certainly should be some de minimis doctrine to avoid spurious suits. "[Ilt would
be unwise to encourage vigilante activity or private detective work by competitors against
each other. But continued violations of noncompetitive law do have an undeniable effect
upon the competitive struggle." 1 CALLMANN 142. See also Chafee, Unfair Competition,
53 HARV. L. REv. 1289, 1320 (1940). While the task of filing or keeping reports at the
state's request is ordinarily a minimal one, witness the recent hue and cry from industry con-
cerning cost directed at the FTC's request for more detailed reports on the interlocking rela-
tionships of many large corporations in reference to future antitrust action.
3. See Lane, W/hy Business Men Violate the Law, 44 J. CRIM. L, C. & P.S. 151 (1953).
Therein the author advances that "need" rather than "opportunity for gain" may be the ex-
planation as to why businessmen run afoul of the law. See also Kadish, Some Observations
on the Use of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing Economic Regulations, 30 U. CHI. L. REV.
423 (1963), where the author states: "[such unlawful competition) is calculated and de-
liberative and directed to economic gain."
4. 2 CALLMANN 929.
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to violate the penal law. Free competition and its benefits thus are re-
stored to the public only where both perform acts which the legislature
previously has not declared unlawful. It obviously is time for both the
legislature and the judiciary to take a fresh look at this quagmire of law
which promotes the violation of one manifestation of public policy to
serve another.
Resulting Confusion
A dear and cogent statement in explanation or justification for this
status of the law does not exist. In terms of generalities, vague at best,
the sources of confusion are "inconsistencies, .... influences," and "vague-
ness."
"Inconsistencies" best describe the conflicting terminology, defini-
tions, and policies5 with which the judiciary is forced to cope within the
area. The judiciary alternately speaks of unfair competition, unfair trad-
ing, unfair methods of competition, trade restraints, and unfair trade
practices. While these terms have a common genesis, their interchange-
ability varies with the jurisdiction.6 More important, a concise definition
or theory of unfair methods of competition does not exist.' It is simply
a body of case law which developed out of the common law.8 Accord-
ingly, few courts have analyzed the welter of precedents to ascertain
governing principles where the plaintiff urges a new method of unfair
competition.' Most often, the traditional defense - the lawful competi-
tor has not shown any "property" or "property right" - is cited summar-
5. Obviously, conflicting policies exist in any area of the law. Witness the present conflict
raging between the injured consumer versus the manufacturer, and the trend towards strict
liability. See, e.g., Keeton, Product Liability - Liability Without Fault and the Requirement
of a Defect, 41 TEXAS L. REV. 855 (1963). But few if any concepts of the law contain as
many conflicting moral principles as "fair competition."
6. 1 CALLMANN 71-72. See 52 OIHo Jtnt. 2d Trademarks, Tradenames, and Unfair Com-
petition §§ 61-88 (1962), where the section on unfair competition includes the following
topics: palming off, unethical and illegal trade practices, unfair advertising, spurious patent
suits, substitution of goods, competing unfairly with former employer, violations of fair trade
act, minimum prices, trading stamps, fair labeling, and trademark and tradename infringement.
7. 1 CALLMANN 71.
8. Id. at 151.
9. See International News Serv. v. The Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918). The Court,
after considering various alternate theories for a basis to prevent unfairness in business, con-
cluded it was an equitable principle. Accord, Brill v. Singer Mfg. Co., 41 Ohio St. 127
(1884) (equitable principle); Block Light Co. v. Tappehorn, 2 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 553 (C.P.
1904). (The law will enjoin every artifice which promotes unfair trade.)
See Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1958). "Unfair methods of
competition... and unfair or deceptive acts or practices . . . are hereby declared, unlawful."
38 Stat. 719 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1958). The Commission issues annually a list of
"Typical Methods and Practices Condemned in Orders to Cease and Desist." See OPPENHEim,
UNFAIR TRADE PRACIncES app. 7 (1950). One court has declared: "[Ihe legal concept
of unfair competition has evolved as a broad and flexible doctrine with a capacity for further
growth to meet changing conditions. There is no complete list of the activities which con-
stitute unfair competition." Dior v. Milton, 155 N.Y.S.2d 443, 451 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
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ily as dispositive of the issue."° Finally, what policies are deserving of pri-
mary status in enforcement? Who is to be protected, the honest trader
or the public? Or, is it sufficient to deny profits only to the dishonest
trader? What acts or injuries should be sufficient to warrant relief? These
are but a few policies which must be weighed and placed in their proper
perspective." The policies which rightfully controlled competition in
the past are not prima facie the correct policies today.
"Influences" best describes the confusion resulting from the roles that
equity, tort law, criminal law, and stare decisis have played in the devel-
opment of the law of unfair competition. 2 Equity required some affirm-
ative showing of irreparable damage and inadequacy of the remedy at
law. Moreover, equity originally had little power to enjoin a crime. Tort
law added the flavor of nuisances and negligence, which complicated the
tort of unfair competition. Criminal law introduced the right of a jury
trial when a criminal violation is charged. Equity was reluctant to en-
join the unlawful competitor since he would be denied this valuable right.
Also, the equity court was hampered by the rule that criminal statutes
were to be strictly construed. "Precedents" include the benevolent re-
spect given to the common law. Relief, furthermore, was curtailed by
such judicial and legislative cliches as the "legislature did not intend to
protect the person or interest advanced by the plaintiff," or, the "legis-
lature acts only through a valid exercise of police power in protection of
public health, safety, and welfare."
Finally, "vagueness" describes the unascertainable boundaries of the
law involved when an attempt is made to enumerate the multitude of
penal violations which could result in an unfair trade practice. Given
any penal law, a factual situation can be constructed wherein a violation
gives a competitive advantage over a rival.
Were all such laws to be included in a casebook on unfair competition,
we would find that the "seamless web" had enmeshed virtually the entire
legal domain.18
A delimitation process is necessary, if only to stay within reasonable
bounds in the length of this paper.'" A general division 5 can be made
10. Pierstorff v. Board of Embalmers, 68 Ohio App. 453, 41 N.E.2d 889 (1941).
11. Pollack, Unfair Trading by Product Simulation: Rule or Rankle?, 23 OHIo ST. L.J. 74
(1962). See also 1 CALLMANN 30-55.
12. Cf. Lowndes, Civil Liability Created by Criminal Legislation, 16 MINN. L. REV. 361
(1932); Morris, Relation of Criminal Statutes to Tort Liability, 46 HARv. L. REv. 453
(1933); Thayer, Public Wrong and Private Action, 27 HARv. L. REv. 317 (1914); Williams,
The Effect of Penal Legislation in the Law of Tort, 23 MODERN L. REv. 233 (1960).
13. HANDLER, TRADE REGULATION 788 (3d ed. 1960).
14. Professor Handler's delimitation restricted discussion to regulations governing selling
methods. Ibid. One court has observed: "Unfair competition can exist in any endeavor to
which human ingenuity lends itself." Pocket Books v. Meyers, 178 Misc. 59, 33 N.Y.S.2d
39, 40 (Sup. Ct. 1942).
15. An alternate useful division is: (1) Direct attack against a competitor, including dis-
[Vol 15:133
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concerning penal statutes and their relation to unfair competition: first,
statutes specifically directed towards traditional forms of unfair competi-
tion, e.g., trademark infringement; second, statutes specifically declaring
certain business methods as unfair competition which formerly were not
subject to legal action, e.g., fair trading; and third, statutes which are not
directed towards competition, but violation of which necessarily yields a
competitive advantage to the wrongdoer, e.g., minimum wage require-
ments. The judiciary has difficulty enjoining criminal violations only
when they arise from the latter class. It is principally to this class of penal
statutes that this note is directed.
The order of topics is as follows: the development of penal violations
as unfair methods of trade; the general noncompetitive penal statutes
which are recognized as unfair methods of trade; and examples of Ohio
decisions. The Ohio Revised Code has been researched for penal law vio-
lations which possibly could serve as the basis for an action in unfair
competition. This note purposely does not distinguish between unfair
competition, unfair methods of competition, or restraints of trade in ref-
erence to liability incurred because of penal violations.
UNFAIR COMPETITION - DEVELOPMENT
The judicial development of unfair competition has been reviewed
most adequately by the leading authorities in the field."6 Sufficient for
present purposes is the following brief summary. Unfair competition law
developed judicially from the law of torts or civil wrongs. Two some-
what antithetical theories of tort liability developed at common law.
First, all actionable wrongs must fall within one of the nominate torts,
e.g., fraud, misrepresentation, disparagement of business, conspiracy, and
inducing breach of contract. Second, courts had judicial discretion to rec-
ognize new claims of unfair competition. The latter theory embraced
conduct prohibited by the nominate torts theory but was broader and in-
dependent of the rigid classifications. 7 The early cases constructed gen-
paragement, boycott, price war, and litigation; (2) denying a customer the opportunity to
judge freely, including use of force or threats of detriments, grant or promise of benefits,
misrepresentation and misbranding, and fake judgment, (3) misappropriation of a com-
petitor's business values; and (4) unlawful conduct of business. See 1 CALLMANN 136.
16. See generally Bunn, National Law of Unfair Competition, 62 HARv. L. REV. 987 (1949);
Callmann, Unfair Competition Without Competition?, 95 U. PA. L. REV. 443 (1947); Chafee,
Unfair Competition, 53 HARv. L. REv. 1289 (1940); Green, Relational Interests, 30 ILL. L.
REV. 1 (1935); Haines, Efforts to Define Unfair Competition, 29 YALE I.J. 1 (1919);
Handler, Unfair Competition, 21 IowA L REv. 175 (1936); Mitchell, Unfair Competition,
10 HARV. I. REV. 275 (1896); Oppenheim, Judicial Process in Unfair Competition Law: A
Perspective and a Focus, 2 P.T.C.J. RES. & ED. 116 (1958); Pollack, Projection for the Re-
valuation of Unfair Competition, 13 OHIo ST. LJ. 187 (1952); Rogers, Unfair Competition,
17 MIcH. L. REv. 490 (1919); Wyman, Competition and the Law, 15 HARv. L. REV. 427
(1902).
17. Oppenheim, supra note 16, at 118.
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eral outlines"s utilizing the two theories, which later cases attempted to
supplement.
A third coexistent and independent method of relief recognized at
common law was unfair competition."9 In its strictest interpretation, un-
fair competition only prohibited "passing off," i.e., the use of an identical
or confusingly similar mark to pass off goods as those emanating from
another. This strict interpretation was expanded by the United States
Supreme Court in International News Serv. v. The Associated Press."0
The Court held that unfair competition may include instances where one
business misappropriates what equitably belongs to another.21 Presently,
unfair competition generally means something more than "passing off."'
Its exact boundaries, however, remain undefined.
In Aikens v. Wisconsin,2" Justice Holmes drew upon the rationale of
the previous cases.
[P]rima facie, the intentional infliction of temporal damages is a
cause of action, which, as a matter of substantive law, whatever may
be the form of the pleading, requires a justification if the defendant is
to escape.2 4
This doctrine, commonly called the prima facie tort theory,25 rejected the
notion that all actionable conduct must fall within one particular tort.
The prima facie tort doctrine has been used chiefly to supplement,
18. See Schoolmaster's Case, Hilary Term. Y.B. Hen. J.V., f. 47, pl. 21 (1410); Keeble v.
Hickeringill, 11 East 573, 103 Eng. Rep. 1127 (K.B. 1706). These early cases utilized tres-
pass on the case as the basis for relief.
19. Mitchell, Unfair Competition, 10 HARv. L. REV. 275 (1896).
20. 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
21. The decision is most noted for its strong stand against misappropriation of a competitor's
trade values. The Court held that a showing of a property right was not needed. Subsequent
attempted applications of this rule, however, were not very successful. "The principle of the
Associated Press case is merely a colorful restatement and application of the rule that every
competing businessman must make use of his own effort and skill." 1 CALLMANN 141.
22. Traditionally, the strictest view has been applied in Illinois. See Time, Inc. v. Viobin
Corp., 128 F.2d 860 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 673 (1942) (unfair competition
limited to passing off); 1 CALLMANN 141 n.13. However, a trend in Illinois away from
this strict view has been evidenced. See HMH Publishing Co. v. Playboy Records, Inc., 161
F. Supp. 540 (N.D. Ill. 1958); CHICAGO B.A., THE LAws OF ILLINOIS RELATING TO COM-
PETITION 143-52 (1960); Note, 2 U. ILL. L.F. 675 (1950). The strict view is rejected
in Stiffel v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 313 F.2d 115, 118 (7th Cir. 1963) (product simulation
as unfair competition). See also White Tower Sys. v. White Castle Sys. of Eating Houses
Corp., 90 F.2d 67 (6th Cit. 1937) (no one should be allowed to sell his goods as those of
another).
23. 195 U.S. 194 (1904).
24. Id. at 204. See also Holmes, Privilege, Malice and Intent, 8 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1894).
25. The elements of the tort are: (1) a conscious intent towards action or non-action, (2)
damage proximately caused, and (3) absence of justification. Its origin generally is attributed
to Lord Bowen's statement in Mogul S.S. Co. v. McGregor, Gow & Co., 23 Q.B.D. 598, 613
(1889), aff'd, [18921 A.C. 25: "intentionally to do that which is calculated in the ordinary
course of events to damage, and which does, in fact, damage another in that other person's
property or trade, is actionable if done without just cause or excuse."
[Vol. 15:133
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not to supplant, the substantive rules of common law. 6 Many states have
either adopted the doctrine or have showed signs of its influence; 7 its
application has covered numerous diverse situations.28
The law of unfair competition, stemming from the three doctrines
of nominate tort, prima fade tort, and unfair competition, is a growing
body of law which the judiciary and legislatures have expanded and
strived to keep in check."
UNFAIR COMPETITION AND PENAL VIOLATIONS - DEVELOPMENT
Parallel to the development of the above three doctrines, recognition
was sought for a doctrine of unfair competition through penal viola-
tions. The struggle was immense, however, due to the antithetical doc-
trines of the various fields of law which paradoxically served as the basis
for the tort. Advances in the commercial world presented new methods
of business. This in turn presented cases of first impression for the judi-
ciary. Invariably, a remedy at law was lacking, and the wronged com-
petitor turned to equity and its injunctive powers. Equity, however, re-
quired numerous prerequisites before extending its aid: the necessity of
a clear case; some "right, tide, or interest"; a legal injury, usually irrepara-
ble; exhaustion or inadequacy of other remedies such as a fear of multi-
plicity of suits; a balance of conveniences in favor of the plaintiff; and
an absence of acquiescence, waiver, or estoppel; all of which were subject
to the discretion of the court.3" Because of these technicalities of equity,
the wronged competitor seldom was successful during the early develop-
ment of unfair competition through penal violations.
26. See Note, 52 COLUM. L Rnv. 503, 505, 512 (1952).
27. Id. at 504 n.13. A case in which the influence was exerted in Ohio is Reichman v.
Drake, 89 Ohio App. 222, 100 N.E.2d 533 (1951).
28. See, e.g., Original Ballet Russe, Ltd. v. Ballet Theatre, Inc., 133 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1943)
(false statements designed to induce breach of contract); Shell Oil Co. v. State Tire & Oil Co.,
126 F.2d 971 (6th Cir. 1942) (fraudulent statements designed to induce severance of business
relationship); Boggs v. Duncan-Schell Furniture Co., 163 Iowa 106, 143 N.W. 482 (1913)
(simulated competition); Memphis Steam Laundry-Cleaners, Inc. v. Lindsey, 192 Miss. 224,
5 So. 2d. 227 (1941) (malicious interference with trade via price cutting).
29. "tTheJ judicial expansion of unfair competition doctrines has been conservative rather
than daring." Oppenheim, supra note 16, at 129. The warning against succumbing to the
".monopoly-phobia" also has been raised. Compare Judge Frank's description of the "mo-
nopoly-phobia" as "both a symptom and a cause of a neurotic tendency which, in refusing
bravely to face facts, cannot yield intelligent advice," with Judge Learned Hand's comment
that "in the guise of protecting against unfair competition, we must be zealous not to create
perpetual monopolies," in Oppenheim, supra note 16, at 129. See Hayes, Unfair Competition
- Another Decade, 51 CALIF. L REV. 51 (1963); Lunsford, Unfair Competition - Uniform
State Law Needed, 44 VA. L. REV. 583 (1958); Pollack, A Projection for the Revaluation
of Unfair Competition, 13 OIO ST. LJ. 187 (1952). See also Bunn, The National Law of
Unfair Competition, 62 HARV. L. REV. 987 (1949); Pollack, The Law of Trade Practices,
23 OHIO ST. UJ. 1 (1962); Note, Implying Civil Remedies from Federal Regulatory Stat-
utes, 77 HARV. L. REV. 285 (1963).
30. 28 AM. JUst. Injunctions §§ 24-66 (1959); accord, 29 OHIO JuR. 2d Injunctions §§
12-44 (1958).
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By contrast, equity's power traditionally had assisted the state in en-
joining common-law public nuisances which also were crimes.3' Through
legislation and the judicial process equity's power was expanded to in-
clude certain unlawful commercial activities, such as prostitution, gam-
bling, bullfights, prize fights, and saloons.3" The power of equity sup-
plemented the state's right to enjoin public nuisances.
Gradually, equity relaxed its requirements, and thoughts of protect-
ing business values gained recognition. The United States Supreme
Court gave protection to business values by denoting them as "property
rights" incident to the lawful operation of a business.33 It also affirmed
that equity, in certain instances, could enjoin the commission of a crime
in the realm of lawful business operations. In a suit to prevent illegal
and forcible obstruction of interstate commerce by a union organizer,
the Court stated:
There must be some interferences, actual or threatened, with property
or rights of a pecuniary nature, but when such interferences appear the
jurisdiction of a court of equity arises, and is not destroyed by the fact
that they are accompanied by or are themselves violations of the
criminal law.
3 4
In a second labor case, involving pickets, the Court held that the plain-
tiff's business was a "property right," and free access to his plant was
incident to the right.3"
Notwithstanding older authorities,3 it became common for the judi-
ciary to allude that where the requisites of equitable relief were present
and such relief was necessary to protect "property rights" incident to a
31. McCLINTOCK, EQUITY § 163 (2d ed. 1948); 29 OHIO JuR. 2d Injunctions § 61 (1958).
See Putnam v. Valentine, 5 Ohio 187 (1831).
32. Intervention by equity into criminal matters has been increased. See Caldwell, Injunc-
tions Against Crime, 26 ILL. L. REV. 259 (1931); Dunbar, Government by Injunction, 13
L.Q. REV. 347 (1897); Gregory, Government by Injunction, 11 HARv. L REV. 487 (1898);
Leflar, Equitable Prevention of Public Wrongs, 14 TExAs L. REV. 427 (1936); Mack, The
Revival of Criminal Equity, 16 HARV. L. REV. 389 (1903); Ralston, Government by Injunc-
tion, 5 CORNELL L.Q. 424 (1920). For a series of Notes concerning the use of the injunction
to prevent crime, see Note, 21 KY. L.J. 332 (1933) (catalog of criminal areas in which
equity operates); Note, 21 KY. L.J. 178 (1933) (nuisances); Note, 21 KY. L.J. 73 (1932)
(historical); Note, 20 KY. L.J. 329 (1932) (prostitution, gambling, bullfights, prize fights,
and saloons); Note, 20 Ky. L.J. 66 (1931) (historical). See also Note, 1953 Wis. L. REv.
163 (repeated criminal violations).
33. See Frost v. Corporation Comm'n, 278 U.S. 515 (1929) (unlicensed competitor); In-
ternational News Serv. v. The Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918) (misappropriation of
work product).
34. In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 593 (1894) (relying on decisions permitting an injunction
against a house of ill-fame). (Emphasis added.)
35. Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 465 (1921); accord, Truax v.
Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921). See also McCLINTOCK, EQUITY § 155 (2d ed. 1948).
36. See, e.g., Smith v. Lockwood & Wood, 13 Barb. 209 (N.Y. 1852); York v. Yzaguairre,
71 S.W. 563 (Tex. Civ. App. 1902). See also Rex v. Robinson, 2 Burr. 799, 803 (K.B.
1759); HIGH, INJUNcTONS (4th ed. 1905).
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lawful business, equity would enjoin criminal acts."7 Furthermore, the
right to conduct a business without unlawful interference was a "property
right."3
8
In 1938 the Restatement of Torts, concerned with unfair methods of
competition in business, sought to
present an orderly statement of the general common law of the United
States, including in that term not only the law developed solely by ju-
dicial decision, but also the law that has grown from the application by
the courts of statutes that have been generally enacted and have been
in force for many years39
The Restatement promulgated rules regarding engaging in business "in
good faith," 1 "for the purpose of causing harm,"' and "in violation of
legislative enactment."" The latter rule is accorded the dubious dis-
tinction of being
one of the major obstacles to the development of a principle that would
allow competitors the right to seek injunctions against the violations of
penal statutes.44
Under the rule, liability is incurred only where "one of the purposes of
the [penal statute) ... is to protect the other against unauthorized com-
petition... ... 4 The plaintiff therefore must show that he is a member
of the class intended as beneficiaries of the statute. When he is "intended
to be protected" the plaintiff has a "property right." However, a very
minimal number of property rights in business would exist if such was
the law. Fortunately, all courts have not adhered to the Restatement's
view.46 Unfortunately, some courts have blindly accepted the rule with-
out even token analysis of the true issues before them.'
Presently, the judiciary generally has required proof of a "property
right," irreparable damage, and an inadequate remedy at law. It is sub-
mitted that the requirement of a "property right" is an outdated fiction
which should be abandoned. When the judiciary "finds" a "property
right," they are stating their decision, not the true rationale of their de-
37. Note, 7 TmxAs L. Rv. 638 (1929).
38. 5 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 2024 (2d ed. 1919).
39. Introduction to RESTATBmENT, TORTS at vii (1938).
40. Id. at 519. The complete description of the Restatement Chapter was "Division Nine,
Interference with Business Relations, Part 1, by Trade Practices, Chapter 34."
41. RESTATEMENT, TORTs § 708 (1938).
42. Id. § 709.
43. Id. § 710.
44. 2 CALLMANN 951.
45. RESTATEMMNT, TORTS § 710 (1938).
46. See, e.g., Seifert v. Buhl Optical Co., 276 Mich. 692, 268 N.W. 784 (1936); Glover v.
Malloska, 238 Mich. 216, 213 N.W. 107 (1927); Ezell v. Ritholh, 188 S.C. 39, 198 S.E.
419 (1938); Featherstone v. Independent Serv. Station Ass'n, 10 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Civ. App.
1928).
47. Floyd & Co. v. Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co., 120 N.E.2d 596 (Ohio Ct. App. 1954).
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cision - the conduct of the unlawful competitor simply is incompatible
with fair business methods.
PENAL VIOLATIONS AS UNFAIR
COMPETITION - GENERALLY
A general classification of regulatory statutes wherein the issue of
unfair competition through penal law violations has been raised in-
cludes the following: franchises, such as common carriers and public
utilities; licenses, from law and medicine to garbage collecting; Sunday
closing laws; lotteries; convict made goods; liquor laws; and false ad-
vertisements.
Franchises
The decisions involving franchises present a near unanimous rule: un-
lawful invasion by a competitor into a business area regulated by fran-
chises will be enjoined at the insistance of a lawful franchise holder.48
This rule most often has protected common carriers, including railroads,
buses and taxis, and public utilities, such as gas, oil, and water.4" The
franchise decisions have ,evidenced very strong language protecting the
law-abiding competitor, e.g., "destructive and forbidden competition,""0
and "acts detrimental to both the public and competitors."'" The basis
for relief has varied, e.g., impairment of valuable property rights,52
public nuisance," special damage,"4 and loss of a public service. 5
Relief is not guaranteed, however. Some courts have required
proof of "direct" injury," systematic diversion, 7 or inadequacy of remedy
at law." Also, recent cases have demonstrated a hesitancy by some
48. The leading case is Frost v. Corporation Comm'n, 278 U.S. 515, 521 (1929), wherein
the operation of an unlawful cotton gin was enjoined. The Court expressly granted the same
rights to both exclusive and nonexclusive lawful franchise holders.
49. See 2 CALLMANN 931.
50. Slusher v. Safety Coach Transit Co., 229 Ky. 731, 733, 17 S.W.2d 1012, 1013 (1929).
See also Annot., 66 A.L.R. 1378 (1930).
51. Wichita Transp. Co. v. People's Taxicab Co., 140 Kan. 40, 34 P.2d 550 (1934). See
also Annot., 94 A.L.R. 771 (1935).
52. Long's Baggage Transfer Co. v. Burford, 144 Va. 339, 132 S.E. 355 (1926).
53. Puget Sound Traction, Light & Power Co. v. Grassmeyer, 102 Wash. 482, 173 Pac. 504
(1918).
54. Long's Baggage Transfer Co. v. Burford, 144 Va. 339, 132 S.E. 355 (1926).
55. Wichita Transp. Co. v. People's Taxicab Co., 140 Kan. 40, 34 P.2d 550 (1934).
56. Davis & Banker, Inc. v. Nickell, 126 Wash. 421, 218 Pac. 198 (1923).
57. Allen v. Black Bus Lines, 291 Ky. 278, 164 S.W.2d 482 (1942).
58. The timidity of some courts is evidenced when every possible equitable objection is
circumvented: "where ... [a violation of a franchise] results ... in special damages to property
rights which it would be difficult... to ascertain, equity, in order to prevent a multiplicity of
prosecutions, the legal remedy being inadequate, will grant complete relief by injunction."
Long's Baggage Transfer Co. v. Burford, 144 Va. 339, 132 S.E. 355 (1926). (Emphasis
added.)
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courts to enjoin the unlicensed competitor where an administrative
agency had some control.59 The franchise decisions generally have not
allowed such defenses as "but for the franchise or license, anyone could
lawfully compete,"" or plaintiff's "property right" was a "mere license.'"
Licenses
Judicial analysis of penal violations involving the unlicensed prac-
tice of an occupation or profession have produced diverse results." First,
distinctions have been drawn between franchises, licenses, and privileges."
Second, the emphasis placed on the purpose of the license requirement
may be decisive. "3  Third, the nature of the occupation or profession
apparently is influential, relief being accorded in some instances only
to "professions." 4
The first obstacle for the lawful competitor is standing to sue.
Three separate and distinct proper parties have been recognized by the
courts: private individuals, law enforcement officers, and regulatory
agencies."5
The licensed practitioner has attempted suit on three bases: interfer-
ence with a property right, nuisance, and express authorization by stat-
ute. " Two property rights generally are alleged: interference with the
operation of the license and interference with profits.
Courts granting relief have done so on several theories:6  the licenseed
competitor has a franchise,68 valuable privilege," property right,"° spe-
cial privilege,71 or a right in the nature of a franchise.72  When stand-
59. Andy's Taxi Serv., Inc. v. Lawrence's Taxi Serv., 285 App. Div. 146, 136 N.Y.S.2ct
330 (1954) (injunction employed sparingly in a debatable field of business competition).
Illinois allows either the competitor or the agency to seek an injunction. Jacksonville Bus
Line Co. v. Watson, 344 Ill. App. 175, 100 N.2d 391 (1951). This decision was criticized
in Note, 13 U. PiTT. L. REV. 586 (1952) as allowing slighting of an administrative body.
60. Long's Baggage Transfer Co. v. Burford, 144 Va. 339, 132 S.E. 355 (1926).
61. 2 CALLMANN 939-46.
62. Id. at 940; Note, 2 MIAMNI L.Q. 54 (1947).
63. 2 CALLMANN 940. The court may require some showing that the legislature intended
to benefit lawful competitors before granting relief.
64. See Klass, What is a Profession, 4 CAN. B. REV. 466 (1961). See also Note, Optometry
is a Profession, 43 DicK. L. REV. 77 (1938). "If the court grants the injunction because of
the nature of the statute - i. e., because it was, at least partly, enacted to protect the prestige
and standing of those who have been duly authorized to pursue their professions - it seems
equally reasonable to grant similar protection to licensed businessmen. And there is also the
further question whether a business can be characterized as a 'profession."' 2 CALLMANN 941-
65. See Comment, 18 OH1o ST. UJ. 402 (1957).
66. Ibid.
67. 2 CALLMANN 945.
68. Unger v. Landlord's Management Corp., 114 N.J. Eq. 68, 168 At. 229 (Ch. 1933).
69. Burden v. Hoover, 9 II. 2d 114, 137 N.E.2d 59 (1956).
70. Paul v. Stanley, 168 Wash. 371, 12 P.2d 401 (1932).
71. Land Title Abstract & Trust Co. v. Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650 (1934).
72. Ibid.
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ing to sue is denied, courts have reasoned that occupational regulation
stemming from a state's police power is designed to protect the public
health and welfare. Thus a public, not private, right is invaded. 3  Al-
ternatively, the courts have held that plaintiff has not shown any "legisla-
tive intent" to confer a "property right."
Relief predicated upon the nuisance theory seldom is granted. 4 First,
the lawful competitor must show special harm, " which is not easily
proven. " Second, where the nuisance issue has been raised, it has been
avoided by either granting an injunction to protect a "property right" or
denying standing to sue.7"
Suits by prosecuting officials also have raised difficult problems.
Some courts distinguish between competent and incompetent unlicensed
practitioners, enjoining only the latter." Others have enjoined every
unlicensed practice as a nuisance per se.79 Where suit is based on the
nuisance theory, a continuous violation must be shown." Thus, the un-
lawful competitor who performs isolated acts goes free. Prosecuting
officials also are restricted by the right to jury trial. Some courts have
hesitated to use unlimited injunctive power to enjoin all crimes."1
Finally, successful suits by regulatory agencies are by no means as-
sured. Courts generally strictly construe any power given to a regulatory
agency. The agency may be required to show a continuous violation or
a clear probability that future violations will occur.8"
73. Note, 18 OHIO ST. .J. 402, 405 n.14. In franchise and utility cases, the plaintiff's right
to sue is not questioned despite the fact that regulation therein also results from a state's
police power. It is reasoned that competition was intended to be regulated. Id. at 405. The
state, however, does not possess a "commerce power"; it regulates all activity through its police
power. Thus, the test is still "statutory intent," and not "public" versus "private" right.
74. Note, 18 OHIo ST. L.J. 402 (1957).
75. PROSSER, TORTS §§ 70-74 (2d ed. 1955).
76. The obvious special injury is competitive financial loss. But proof of dollar loss by
plaintiff and dollar gain by defendant, standing alone, may not suffice. Moon v. Clark, 192
Ga. 47, 14 S.E.2d 481 (1941).
77. Note, 18 OHIO ST. L.J. 402, 407 (1957).
78. Arkansas State Bd. of Architects v. Clark, 291 S.W.2d 262 (Ark. Sup. Ct. 1956). See
Note, 18 OHIo ST. L.J. 402, 410 n.40 (1957).
79. Boggs v. Werner, 372 Pa. 312, 94 A.2d 50 (1953).
80. Hudkins v. Arkansas State Bd. of Optometry, 208 Ark. 577, 187 S.W.2d 538 (1945)
(criminal remedy adequate).
81. Other courts have avoided this problem by considering the statutes as primarily regula-
tory in nature and only incidentally penal. See Dean v. State ex rel. Bd. of Examiners, 233
Ind. 25, 116 N.E.2d 503 (1954).
82. See Note, 18 OHIO ST. L.J. 402 (1957), concluding that the licensed practitioner should
not have any standing to enforce statutes regulating professions, since "public," not "private,"
rights are involved.
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Attorneys
Concerning individual professions, lawyers generally have been al-
lowed to enjoin unlicensed competitors.' Several theories have been
advanced as the basis for this relief.84 An occasional decision, however,
has denied the individual practitioner standing to sue.85 Also, some
courts have allowed suit only because it was on behalf of a class." Other
courts have required a showing of special damages.'
Optometrists
Optometrists, in certain instances, have been able to enjoin unlicensed
competitors." The decisions, however, are characterized by discord.89
Undoubtedly the leading case denying relief is New Hampshire Bd. of
Registration v. Scott Jewelry Co." Therein, the court listed a virtual
catalog of defenses available to the defendant: the illegal practice of op-
tometry was not a public nuisance; there was an adequate remedy at
law; the statute did not intend to confer a "property right" or rights of a
pecuniary nature; enforcement of the statute was a duty of public offi-
cials; but for the requirement of a license, anyone can practice; the pur-
pose of the statute was to protect public health; and the license require-
ments can be changed by the state.9 Defenses such as these have
plagued every profession that has sought to enjoin unlicensed practice.
83. See, e.g., Unger v. Landlord's Management Corp., 114 N.J. Eq. 68, 168 At. 229 (Ch.
1933); Land Title Abstract & Trust Co. v. Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650 (1934).
84. See 2 CA.LLMANN 945-46. "[I]t has been held, that they are franchise holders; or that
they have a right in the nature of a franchise; or, at any rate, a valuable property right; and
in some courts lawyers are especially protected as 'officers of the court."' Ibid. (Citations
omitted.)
85. Hulbert v. Mybeck, 220 Ind. 530, 44 N.E.2d 830 (1942).
86. See Dworken v. Apartment House Owners' Ass'n, 38 Ohio App. 265, 176 N.E. 577
(1931).
87. Wollitzer v. National Tide Guar. Co., 148 Misc. 529, 266 N.Y. Supp. 184 (Sup. Ct.
1933) (mere allegation of damage insufficient).
88. McMurdo v. Getter, 298 Mass. 363, 10 N.E.2d 139 (1937). See Note, Optometry is a
Profession, 43 DICK. L. Rnv. 77 (1938).
"89. In McMurdo v. Getter, supra note 88, at 364, 10 N.E.2d at 139, the court reasoned:
"No question is made of the right of the plaintiff and the intervenor to relief if the defendants
are practicing optometry illegally." (Citing Frost v. Corporation Comm'n, 278 U.S. 515,
521 (1929).) However, in Georgia Bd. of Optometry v. Friedmans' Jewelers, Inc., 183 Ga.
669, 189 S.E. 238 (1936), the state could not enjoin the operation of a store practicing
optometry through licensed optometrists. The court reasoned the statute was designed to
protect public health and safety and not to create a monopoly for individuals. Cf. Ezell v.
Ritholz, 188 S.C. 39, 198 S.E. 419 (1938) (Competitors, and not the state are, the proper
party to bring suit.).
90. 90 N.H. 378, 9 A.2d 513 (1939).
91. The court recognized that injunction was proper, but limited its application to cases
where (1) irreparable injury to a property right existed; (2) criminal proceedings were
inadequate; (3) common-law remedies afforded inadequate protection; (4) unlawful practice
was a public nuisance; or (5) plaintiff was in a position to show damage.
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Chiropodists
Decisions concerning chiropodists also have evidenced havoc. Un-
licensed practice has been enjoined as a nuisanceY But relief has been
denied where plaintiff had a "mere" license and not a franchise 3 or
where a nuisance per se was not proven.94 Recently, a lower court sur-
prisingly inferred that the real purpose of the competitor's suit was to
restrain the commission of a crime and, therefore, the court refused to
issue an injunction. Fortunately, on appeal,9" the court stated: "[W]e
are convinced that there are sound, compelling reasons for bringing Illi-
nois in line with the majority position and granting relief in a case of
this nature."9
Doctors, Dentists, Veterinarians, Photographic Examiners,
Public Weighers, and Vessel Pilots
Doctorse7 and dentists also have been granted relief. 8 A veterinarian
was denied injunctive relief 9 against an unlicensed competitor. Similar-
ly, the Board of Photographic Examiners was denied relief, as they had
not shown a "private right" or an inadequate remedy at law.' 0 Public
weighers... and licensed vessel pilots, however,0 2 have successfully en-
joined unlicensed competitors.
92. People ex rel. Bennett v. Laman, 158 Misc. 909, 286 N.Y. Supp. 467 (Sup. Ct. 1936),
rev'd on appeal, 277 N.Y. 368, 14 N.E.2d 439 (1938). Compare Dean v. State, 151 Ga.
371, 106 S.E. 792 (1921) (unlicensed practice not a nuisance per se). See Annot., 40
A.L.R. 1132 (1921).
93. Mosig v. Jersey Chiropodists, 122 N.J. Eq. 382, 194 Ad. 248 (Ch. 1937); cf. Unger v.
Landlord's Management Corp., 114 N.J. Eq. 68, 168 Ad. 229 (Ch. 1933) (lawyers have
franchise amounting to a "property right").
94. Dean v. State, 151 Ga. 371, 106 S.E. 792 (1921).
95. Burden v. Hoover, 7 Ill. App. 2d 296, 129 N.E.2d 463 (1955), red, 9 Ill. 2d 114,
137 N.E.2d 59 (1956).
96. Burden v. Hoover, 9 Ill. 2d 114, 137 N.E.2d 59, 61 (1956). The court noted that
there are two prevailing theories upon which relief is granted: first, the license is a franchise
in the nature of a property right which equity would protect; and second, the unlicensed prac-
tice is a public nuisance which equity would abate. "Other reasons have been suggested,
such as the prevention of unfair competition, but rarely constitute the basis of a decision."
Id. at 61.
97. Sloan v. Mitchell, 113 W. Va. 506, 168 S.E. 800 (1933) (individual allowed suit on
basis of valuable franchise), citing Dworken v. Apartment House Owners' Ass'n, 38 Ohio App.
265, 176 N.E. 577 (1931). See also Palmer v. O'Hara, 359 Pa. 213, 58 A.2d 574 (1948).
98. Kentucky State Bd. of Dental Examiners v. Payne, 213 Ky. 382, 281 S.W. 188 (1926)
(alluded to nuisance theory); Curtis v. Registered Dentists, 193 Okla. 233, 143 P.2d 427
(1943); Boggs v. Werner, 372 Pa. 312, 94 A.2d 50 (1953); accord, Taylor v. New Sys.
Prosthetic Dental Lab., Inc., 29 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 451 (C.P. 1932).
99. Drummond v. Rowe, 155 Va. 725, 156 S.E. 442 (1931).
100. Matthews v. Lawrence, 212 N.C. 537, 193 S.E. 730 (1937).
101. Davidson v. Sadler, 23 Tex. Civ. App. 600, 57 S.W. 54 (Civ. App. 1900). Plaintiffs
alleged and the court agreed that there was irreparable damage and an inadequate remedy at
law. There was no discussion of "property rights" or unfair competition.
102. Olsen v. Smith, 68 S.W. 320 (Tex. Civ. App. 1902), aff'd, 195 U.S. 332 (1902).
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Garbage Collectors
Unlicensed garbage collecting has been enjoined by the state.' A
garbage collector demonstrated foresight in a recent decision. 4 As-
sumedly recognizing the difficulties in establishing his trade as a "profes-
sion" entitled to enjoin unlicensed competitors, the garbage collector had
the city covenant that they would sue all violators. An alleged violator
subsequently not only was enjoined in a suit by the city, but also was
forced to respond in damages.
Lotteries
Lotteries as a method of unfair competition have proven to be a fer-
tile area of litigation. As a general rule, lotteries may be enjoined at
the instance of a competitor.0 5 In the leading case of Glover v. Ma!-
loska, ' the court stated:
It would astound the business world to hold that an established business
is barren of property rights of a pecuniary nature .... No one should
be permitted to employ criminal means in trade rivalry.' 07
Defenses such as "equity would not enjoin a crime,"'0 8 and "the plaintiff
has not shown a right or interest in future trade" have been overruled."0 9
Relief has been denied in certain instances where the competitor could
'See also Peterson v. Smith, 30 Tex. Civ. App. 139, 69 S.W. 542 (Civ. App. 1902) (com-
panion case).
103. Jansen Farms, Inc. v. City of Indianapolis, 202 Ind. 138, 171 N.E. 199 (1930), Annot.,
72 A.LR. 514 (1930).
104. Harvey v. Prall, 250 Iowa 1111, 97 N.W.2d 306 (1959).
105. E.g., California Gasoline Retailers v. Regal Petroleum Corp., 322 P.2d 945 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1958); Jones v. Smith Oil & Ref. Co., 295 IMI. App. 519, 15 N.E.2d 42 (1938); Sproat-
Temple Theatre Corp. v. Colonial Theatrical Enterprise, Inc., 276 Mich. 127, 267 N.W. 602
(1936); Glover v. MaHoska, 238 Mich. 216, 213 N.W. 107 (1927); Featherstone v. Inde-
pendent Serv. Station Ass'n., 10 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928), Annot., 52 A.L.R. 77
(1927).
106. 238 Mich. 216, 213 N.W. 107 (1927).
107. Glover v. Malloska, supra note 106, at 220, 213 N.W. at 108. See also Featherstone
v. Independent Serv. Station Ass'n, 10 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928) (continued viola-
'tion of penal statute enjoined as a method of unfair competition).
108. '"The injunction in this case was not issued on the theory that it was to restrain the
appellant from committing a crime, but on the theory that the contemplated plan was a
violation of law and that the same would be unfair competition of trade .... Jones v. Smith
Oil & Ref. Co., 295 I. App. 519, 523, 15 N.E.2d 42, 44 (1938).
109. "Yjet a competitor may ask for the restraint of acts and conduct prohibited by law,
that unreasonably interfere with, divert patrons from, and injure his business .... [The]
plaintiff... is entitled to have his business protected from unfair competition produced by
the unlawful means employed by this competitors .... " Featherstone v. Independent Serv. Sta-
tion Ass'n, 10 S.W.2d 124, 128 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928).
The problem of computing damages in an action at law as compared to injunctive re-
lief was recognized in California Gasoline Retailers v. Regal Petroleum Corp., 322 P.2d 945, 955
(Cal. Ct. App. 1958): "[Ilt is apparent that it would be extremely difficult to ascertain the
amount of compensation which would afford adequate relief to plaintiffs .... [Plaintiffs]
have an interest of pecuniary nature and rights of economic substance and economic value in
the businesses which they conduct."
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prove neither special injury1 ' ° nor that the loss of business was traceable
directly to the growth of defendant's business."' The lawful competitor
also may be denied relief on the basis of the older equitable defenses." 2
In a recent decision, a violator in a suit by a competitor successfully
avoided an anti-lottery statute with a somewhat novel defense. The
court reasoned that the purpose" 3 of the statute was to prevent impover-
ishment of persons participating in the lottery and not to regulate compe-
tition. As indicated in the dissenting opinion, this is contrary to all pre-
vious reasoning." 4
Sunday Laws
Repeated attempts to enjoin continuous violations of Sunday laws
generally have been unsuccessful." 5 Successful defenses have included
absence of "property rights,""'  not a nuisance per se," ' deprivation of the
right to jury trial,"' adequate remedy at law,"9 no right to future
trade, 2 ° and no special damage.'' Relief has been granted, however, on
the public nuisance theory. 22
110. Moon v. Clark, 192 Ga. 47, 14 S.E.2d 481 (1937). Plaintiff proved (1) loss of sales
and (2) diversion of trade to the defendant. The court required proof of (1) public
nuisance and (2) special damage. The court reasoned that plaintiff's proof did not demand
a finding of special injury.
111. United-Detroit Theaters Corp. v. Colonial Theatrical Enterprise, 280 Mich. 425, 273
N.W. 756 (1957).
112. Eckdahl v. Hurwitz, 56 Wyo. 19, 103 P.2d 161 (1940) (adequate remedy at law in
police prosecution).
113. See Cudd v. Aschenbrenner, 377 P.2d 150 (Ore. Ct. App. 1962); cf. McFadden v.
Bain, 162 Ore. 250, 91 P.2d 292 (1939).
114. Cudd v. Aschenbrenner, supra note 113, at 159. See Blackburn v. Ippolito, 156 So.
Zd 550 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
115. Annot., 36 A.L.R. 493 (1924).
116. York v. Yzaguairre, 31 Tex. Civ. App. 26, 71 S.W. 563 (Civ. App. 1902) (barber-
shop). This is a leading case within the area of unfair competition and penal violations
wherein relief was denied.
117. Motor Car Dealers Ass'n v. Fred S. Haines Co., 128 Wash. 267, 222 Pac. 611 (1924)
(selling cars legal on other days).
118. Ibid.
119. State ex rel. Taylor v. Iola Theater Corp., 136 Kan. 411, 15 P.2d 459 (1932). Al-
though the action was brought by the state, the court required a clear showing of a nuisance.
The dissent reasoned: (1) where a public statute is openly and continuously violated, a
public nuisance existed; and (2) the continuous violations indicated there was no adequate
remedy at law.
120. Corchine v. Henderson, 70 S.W.2d 766 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934) (junkyard). See 13
TEXAs L. REV. 136 (1935). "[Ilt is evident that appellees seek equitable relief for the
violation of a criminal statute, on grounds of speculative injury to property rights, based on
the loss of trade and patronage which they reasonably expect to reap in the future." Corchine
v. Henderson, supra at 767. Accord, Chapter 215, Associated Master Barbers & Beauticians
v. Brown, 315 S.W.2d 17 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958).
121. Chapter 215, Associated Master Barbers & Beauticians v. Brown, supra note 120.
122. Rose Theater, Inc. v. Lilly, 185 Ga. 53, 193 S.E. 866 (1937) (based on information
filed by citizens).
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Convict-made Goods
A competitor generally can enjoin the sale of unmarked convict-made
goods.' One court reasoned that the penal statute was "civil in nature"
when used to protect private pecuniary interests. 4 Relief has been de-
nied on grounds that the statute was enacted primarily for the protection
of the public and that the lawful competitor has not shown any special
damage.125
Liquor Laws
Finally, there have been unsuccessful attempts to enjoin the unli-
censed sale of liquor.12' The few cases arising in this area follow the
general reasoning evidenced in other license cases, i.e., no special dam-
age,127 no "property right" shown,' 28 or characterization as a mere license
and not a franchise.2
OHIO LAw - GENERALLY
In Ohio, as elsewhere, 3 ' the general rule is that
a court of equity will not interfere by injunction to restrain or prevent
the commission of criminal acts or the violation of the penal laws of
the state merely upon the ground that the threatened act is illegal.'13
The courts have reasoned that as equity lacks criminal jurisdiction,'32 its
power of injunction is not the proper remedy to compel obedience to the
123. Choctaw Pressed Brick Co. v. Townsend, 108 Okla. 235, 236 Pac. 46 (1925), Annot.,
52 A.L.R. 79, 81 (1928).
124. Choctaw Pressed Brick Co. v. Townsend, supra note 123. The court reasoned the pur-
pose of the statute was twofold: first, protection of free labor against competition with convict
labor, and second, protection of the public against deception in the sale of convict goods not
labeled as such.
125. Smith v. Lockwood & Wood, 13 Barb. 209 (N.Y. 1852). This was the earliest case
research revealed. Needless to say, it has been cited many times as the basis for denying relief.
126. Long v. Southern Express Co., 201 Fed. 441 (S.D. Fla. 1912), rev'd, 202 Fed. 462
(5th Cit. 1913); Clark v. Crown Drug Co., 236 Mo. App. 206, 146 S.W.2d 98 (1940),
rev'd, 348 Mo. 91, 152 S.W.2d 145 (1941).
127. Long v. Southern Express Co., supra note 126; Annot., 52 A.LR. 79, 81 (1928).
128. Clark v. Crown Drug Co., 348 Mo. 91, 152 S.W.2d 145 (1941).
129. Ibid. See 54 HARV. L. REV. 1247 (1941).
130. 28 AM. JUR. Injunctions 5 157 (1959).
131. 20 Omo JuLR 2d Injunctions § 104 (1958), citing State ex rel. Reynolds v. Capital
City Dairy Co., 62 Ohio St. 123, 56 N.E. 651 (1900) (proper remedy is prosecution at law);
Canton v. Fedco, Inc., 45 Ohio L. Abs. 620 (C.P. 1945) (same). See also 20 Omo Ju. 2d
Equity 5 59 (1956), citing Merz v. Murchison, 11 Ohio C.C.R. (n.s.) 458 (Cir. Ct. 1908)
(unlicensed physician); Ricard Boiler & Engine Co. v. Benner, 14 Ohio Dec. (N.P.) 357
(C.P. 1904) (labor strike); Hawksworth v. Hawksworth, 11 Ohio Dec. (N.P.) 817 (C.P.
1898) (threatened assault and battery); Fitzpatrick v. Bromwell Brush & Wire Goods Co.,
5 Ohio N.P. 165 (C.P. 1898) (convict labor contract); Fisher v. Lake Side Park Hotel &
Amusement Co., 4 Ohio N.P. 329 (C.P. 1897) (Sunday law).
132. 19 AM. JuL- Equity § 142 (1939).
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criminal laws of the state.133 Prosecution is thus the proper remedy"'
even where lax enforcement can be shown. 3 5 The defendant cannot be
denied the right to a jury trial.'
The foregoing limitations upon equity power are valid only where
the plaintiff's case rests solely upon the violation of a penal law. Where
he can demonstrate a civil or "property right," assuming irreparable in-
jury and an inadequate remedy at law, equity has jurisdiction.3 7 This
property or civil right generally will arise from principles of common
law. Other sources include legislative enactments and judicial interpre-
tation, i.e., a new form of unfair competition is recognized. 38 It is stated
generally that recognition of a new right does not alter principles of
equity. Rather, the character of the right requires the application of
equitable remedies to insure adequate enforcement or protection.' Few
decisions have discussed the fact that the new cause of action may, in
fact, deny the right of trial by jury.'40
Thus, injunctive relief generally depends on the existence of a "prop-
erty right." Ohio considers "all contract rights and civil rights of a pecu-
niary nature, whether technically property or not," as being within the
term "property rights."'' Decisions indicate that the right of a person
to pursue a business calling or profession is a "property right."'42
133. State ex rel. Chalfin v. Glick, 172 Ohio St. 249, 175 N.E.2d 68 (1961) (compulsory
school attendance); Renner Brewing Co. v. Rolland, 96 Ohio St. 432, 118 N.E. 118 (1917)
(trademark infringement).
134. State ex rel. Reynolds v. Capital City Dairy Co., 62 Ohio St. 123, 56 N.E. 651 (1900);
Canton v. Fedco, Inc., 45 Ohio L. Abs. 620 (C.P. 1945); State v. Mills, 20 Ohio N.P. (n.s.)
427 (C.P. 1918).
135. State v. Mills, supra note 134; Ricard Boiler & Engine Co. v. Benner, 14 Ohio Dec.
(N.P.) 357 (C.P. 1904).
136. State ex rel. Bosch v. Denny's Place, 98 Ohio App. 351, 129 N.E.2d 532 (1954)
(liquor laws).
137. Ohio Water Serv. Co. v. Newman, 31 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 75 (C.P. 1933) (abutting
property owner, continued trespass); Goodman v. Western Bank & Trust Co., 28 Ohio N.P.
(n.s.) 272 (C.P. 1931) (unauthorized practice of law); Davis v. Schmidt, 23 Ohio N.P.
(n.s.) 235 (C.P. 1921) (abutting property owner, violation of ordinance); cf. Canton v.
Fedco, Inc., 45 Ohio L. Abs. 620 (C.P. 1945) (abutting property owner, violation of zoning
laws).
138. 52 OHIO JtJR. 2d Torts § 4 (1962) (explained in terms of duty); 20 01o JuL. 2d
Equity § 10 (1956) (explained in terms of jurisdiction).
139. 20 Omo Jum. 2d Equity § 10 (1956) (discussing new statutory rights). See an example
of new statutory rights in OHIO REV. CODE §§ 1331.01-.99 (hereinafter cited as CODE §)
(antitrust laws). See also Cigar Maker's Protective Union v. Lindner, 2 Ohio N.P. 114
(C.P. 1895) (unauthorized use of union label).
140. Wind v. State, 102 Ohio St. 62, 130 N.E. 35 (1921) (prostitution). See CODE §
3767.01.
141. 29 OHIO JtuR. 2d Ijunctions 5 60 (1958), citing 20 OHIo Jim. 2d Equity § 54
(1956). Relief may be granted in absence of property right when the legislature has declared
certain acts a public nuisance. Examples are prohibitions against gambling (CODE § 2915.02),
and prize fighting. See State ex rel. Sheets v. Hobart, 8 Ohio N.P. 246 (1901). The con-
stitutionality of such statutes has been universally upheld. Annot., 49 A.L.R. 635 (1927)
(liquor laws); Annot., 5 A.L.R. 1474 (1920) (public nuisance). Alternatively to the nui-
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Regarding legislative enactments, where injunctive power is express-
ly included, little difficulty is experienced in granting relief to the lawful
competitor.'43 The perplexing issues arise where either the existence of
a "property right" or the right to injunctive relief is not manifested.
OHIo DECISIONS - EXAMPLES
Considering only the area of unfair competition based upon penal
violations, the total number of Ohio decisions is at a minimum. The
large majority of Ohio cases involving "noncompetitive" statutes have
been concerned with alleged unauthorized practice of a trade or profes-
sion.'44 Outside of this area, the plaintiff has little chance of success.
Even within the area of professional or trade protection, success is far
from guaranteed. The earlier cases indicate a total lack of recognition
of an injury to a "profession" through unlawful practice.4" The later
cases only accord recognition of the "elite" professions.'46
Merz v. Murchison (Physicians)
The early attitude of the judiciary is demonstrated in Merz v. Murch-
ison." " A licensed physician sought to enjoin an unlicensed practice.
He urged that the practice of medicine was a "property right" conferred
by statutory license and that interference with such was unlawful com-
petition. 4 ' The court held that in absence of legal prohibitions, one
person would be as free as another to practice medicine without interfer-
ence from the courts; and that the benefit derived from the statute by
those engaged in the practice of medicine was only "incidental." "The
sance theory, the state is considered to have both its own rights and the rights of the public to
uphold. Annot., 40 A.L.R. 1145, 1150 (1926). See also State ex tel. Crabbe v. Thistledown
Jockey Club, Inc., 114 Ohio St. 582, 151 N.E. 709 (1926) (gambling); Widmer v. Fretti,
95 Ohio App. 7, 116 N.E.2d 728 (1952) (gambling); Canton v. Fedco, Inc., 45 Ohio L
Abs. 620 (C.P. 1945) (zoning); Shaw v. Interstate Say., Loan & Trust Corp., 5 Ohio N.P.
411 (Super. Ct. 1898) (lottery).
142. Dworken v. Apartment House Owners' Ass'n, 38 Ohio App. 265, 176 N.E. 577 (1931)
(profession, practice of law); Cleveland Shopping News Co. v. Lorain, 13 Ohio L. Abs. 265
(Ct. App. 1932) (business); Eureka Foundry Co. v. Lehker, 13 Ohio Dec. (N.P.) 398
(Super. Ct. 1902) (business).
143. E.g., CODE §§ 713.13, 715.30 (zoning), 917.04 (milk), 1101.12 (banks), 1331.11
(monopolies), 1707.25, .26 (securities), 2723.01 (levies and assessments), 2911.42 (adver-
tisement), 3767.05 (prostitution), 4905.60 (public utilities), 5703.39 (taxes).
144. The issue of false advertising often is interwoven, as the unauthorized person in many
instances attempts some promotional scheme. See Taylor v. New Sys. Prosthetic Dental Lab.,
Inc., 29 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 451 (C.P. 1931).
145. Merz v. Murchinson, 11 Ohio C.C.R. (n.s.) 458 (Cir. Ct. 1908).
146. Protection generally extends only to doctors, lawyers, and other professional men. See
Pierstorff v. Board of Embalmers & Funeral Directors, 68 Ohio App. 453, 41 N.E.2d 889
(1941) (no "property right" in embalmer's license).
147. 11 Ohio C.C.IL (n.s.) 458 (Cir. Ct. 1908).
148. Id. at 460.
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circle of competition may be narrowed... but that is not the purpose of
the law.'
' 49
Goodman v. Western Bank & Trust Co. (Attorneys)
A contrary view was taken in Goodman v. Western Bank & Trust
Co., 5' a case involving lawyers. The court rejected the view that the
purpose of the statute forbidding unlicensed practice was to protect the
community from the consequences of a want of professional qualifica-
tions. 5' Instead, it held that the right to practice law conferred "a right
to reap the privileges and emoluments of ... [ones] office ... free from
competition of others, [who arel not such officers of the court .... 152
The following arguments of the defendant, previously traditional de-
fenses, also were rejected: equity will not restrain the violation of a penal
law;... the criminal remedy was sufficient;54 absent a "property right" or
special injury, equity would not interfere; 55 and the defendant was de-
prived of a jury trial. 5" Since the profession of dentistry has been pro-
tected by injunctive relief, it is unlikely that the Merz decision remains
sound law today. 5
149. Ibid., citing State v. Gardner, 58 Ohio St. 599 (1898) (constitutionality of statute
requiring licenses for plumbers); Palmer & Crawford v. Tingle, 55 Ohio St. 423, 445 (1896)
(constitutionality of mechanics lien). The court also relied on the now antidated authorities
which traditionally denied relief: Lord Mansfield in Rex v. Robinson, 2 Burr. 799, 803 (K.B.
1759) (where a statute creates a new offense against conduct which previously was lawful
and also provides a specific remedy, that remedy is exclusive); Smith v. Lockwood & Wood,
13 Barbour 209 (N.Y. 1852); York v. Yzaguairre, 71 S.W. 563 (Tex. Civ. App. 1902);
1 HIGH, INJUTNCTIONS § 20 (4th ed. 1905) (injunction solely against diminution of profits
not allowed).
150. 28 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 272 (C.P. 1931).
151. Id. at 276. Once this argument was accepted, courts held that they would not interfere
merely because the practice was unskillful. See Merz v. Murchison, 11 Ohio C.C.R. (n.s.)
458, 459-60 (Cir. Ct. 1908).
152. Goodman v. Western Bank & Trust Co., 28 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 272, 277 (C.P. 1931).
153. Ibid, citing In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1894); Renner Brewing Co. v. Rolland, 96 Ohio
St. 432, 118 N.E. 118 (1917). The court refused to base its holding upon the "nuisance"
theory. Goodman v. Western Bank & Trust Co., supra note 152, at 278.
154. Citing State ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Capital City Dairy Co., 62 Ohio St. 350, 366
(1900) (suit to disband corporation continuously violating oleomargarine law).
155. The court cited with approval: "This right of a citizen to pursue any calling, business,
or profession he may choose is a property right to be guarded by equity as zealously as any
other form of property." New Method Laundry Co. v. McCann, 174 Cal. 26, 31, 161 Pac.
990, 991 (1916).
156. "It is obvious that if such objection is tenable none of the numerous proceedings could
have been maintained wherein Courts of Equity have enjoined the commission of acts not-
withstanding there was a punishment or penalty for the same." Goodman v. Western Bank
& Trust Co., 28 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 272, 281 (C.P. 1931).
157. Taylor v. New Sys. Prosthetic Dental Lab., Inc., 29 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 451 (C.P. 1931).
158. Burden v. Hoover, 9 Ii. 2d 114, 117, 137 N.E.2d 59, 61 (Ct. App. 1956) (citing
changed attitude of judiciary by 1931 and Ohio as forerunner). Cf. Dworken v. Apartment
House Owners Ass'n, 38 Ohio App. 265, 176 N.E. 577 (1931) (Merz case distinguished
instead of overruled).
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Perstorff v. Board of Embalmers
The less "elite" professions or occupations have experienced difficulty
in achieving relief from unlicensed practice. In Perstorff v. Board of
Embalmers,159 a suit by competitors to enjoin unprofessional conduct of
an unlicensed embalmer, relief was refused. The court stated:
A license, such as held by appellant, is not a property right; it is not
a contract, and the Legislature may "impose new or additional burdens
on the license," and reserves the right to "alter the license, or to re-
voke or annul it," even though the licensee has expended money in re-
liance thereon.160
The decision, regardless of outcome, would have been far better reasoned
had the court relied on decisions involving unlicensed professions or occu-
pations rather than adding confusion by relying on cases involving public
transportation."6' A reasonable assumption is that the court was legally
unaware of the distinction.
Floyd & Co. v. Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. (Discrimination)
Partial fault emanates from the infrequency with which the judiciary
is confronted with the subtilties arising from the tort of unfair competi-
tion. The judicial unawareness of unfair competition via penal violations is
poignantly demonstrated in Floyd & Co. v. Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co.'62
Plaintiff, a dealer in gas heating appliances, was denied the right to sue
a gas company for the preferred treatment of the plaintiff's competitors
in violation of statute. The statute forbids a utility from giving any un-
due or unreasonable advantage to any corporation.'63 The defendant ad-
mitted it had wilfully failed to comply with an order of the Public Utili-
ties Commission requiring all utilities to refrain from supplying gas to
new or prospective consumers until the consumers first had made written
application and obtained written consent from the utility. The court
turned directly to the Restatement of Torts, section 286, as the basis for
denying relief. This section denies liability when a violation of a legisla-
tive enactment is shown, unless "the intent of the enactment is . . . to
protect an interest" of the injured as an individual and "the interest in-
vaded is one which the enactment is intended to protect."'
159. 68 Ohio App. 453 (1941).
160. Id. at 455, citing Sylvania Busses v. Toledo, 118 Ohio St. 187, 197, 160 N.E. 674,
677 (1928) (motor busses operating in violation of city ordinance). (Emphasis added.)
161. The court could have merely cited Merz v. Murchison, 11 Ohio C.C.R. (n.s.) 458
(Cir. Ct. 1908). Note also that the public transportation cases may involve a certificate of
convenience, which is usually more significant than a mere license. See 2 CALLMANN 940
n.71.
162. 96 Ohio App. 133, 120 N.E.2d 596 (1954), affirming 122 N.E.2d 717 (C.P. 1953).
163. CODE § 4905.35. A violation of this statute incurs a liability of treble damages. See
CODE § 4905.61.
164. RESTATEMENT, ToRTs § 286 (1934).
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We think the sole purpose of the statute was to regulate public utilities
in discharging the obligation they had assumed to consumers of gas....
It seems to us that the only interest contemplated was that which might
result from the consumption of gas. ... And the rules or orders were
promulgated to regulate and conserve gas so as to enhance the ability
of the defendant to supply it in such a way as to promote the public
welfare to the greatest possible extent.... [I]t was [not] the appliance
business that the legislature intended to regulate and protect.165
Inexcusably, the court failed to cite a single decision involving unfair
competition as precedent.'66
Cuyahoga County Funeral Directors Ass'n v. Sunset Mortuary, Inc.
Most recently, in Cuyahoga County Funeral Directors Ass'n v. Sunset
Mortuary, Inc.,6' an embalmer unsuccessfully sought to enjoin a com-
petitor's unlawful advertisement. The Ohio Revised Code forbade the
establishment of a funeral home other than in the name of a licensed
funeral director. 6 Again, traditional defenses were honored by the
court: the statute did not intend to bestow any franchise or "property
right"; plaintiff had no right or interest injured which was different
from that of the public; and the statute was a valid exercise of police
power. 69
The court added that the plaintiffs were not the real parties in inter-
est and, therefore, had no standing to sue.
When a regulatory statute purportedly enacted under the police power
of a state does not provide for its enforcement by private individuals,
or create a course of action in private individuals, its enforcement
ordinarily is left to the executive branch of the government.170
165. Floyd & Co. v. Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co., 96 Ohio App. 133, 120 N.E.2d 596,
603 (1954). (Emphasis added.) The court indicated that any other interpretation, i.e., an in-
tent to regulate the appliance industry, would deprive the defendant of the privilege of operating
its utility and as such, would be beyond a state's police power! Id. at 144-45, 120 N.E.2d at
603-04. The court appeared relieved to discuss a "recognized" tort - the interference with
contractual relations which plaintiff did -not raise. Id. at 146, 120 N.E.2d at 604.
166. The court relied mainly on Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D.
Pa. 1946) (alleged violation of the Security Exchange Act); and Jennie DePauw Memorial
Methodist Episcopal Church v. New Albany Water Works, 193 Ind. 368, 140 N.E. 540
(1923) (statutory negligence). The court considered and rejected decisions involving the
penal provisions of the Sherman and Clayton Antitrust Acts.
"None of [these cases] . . . involved a public utility bound to furnish a service or com-
modity against which the charge was made of a failure to perform causing damage to a non-
user of the service or commodity. It seems to us that the most that can be said is that those
cases are of some value as examples of statutory interpretation." Floyd & Co. v. Cincinnati
Gas & Elec. Co., 96 Ohio App. 133, 140-41, 120 N.E.2d 596, 602 (1954).
167. 181 N.E.2d 309 (Ohio Ct. App. 1962).
168. CODE § 4717.11. The State Board of Embalmers and Funeral Directors had authority
to make and adopt rules for the enforcement of CODE § 4717.17. See Conn § 4717.04.
169. Plaintiff did not question the validity of the statute. The court, however, in finding
an absence of unfair competition, was prone to recite anything remotely connected with
unfair competition to buttress its position.
170. Cuyahoga County Funeral Directors Ass'n v. Sunset Mortuary, Inc., 181 N.E.2d 309,
313 (Ohio Ct. App. 1962).
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This probably is the largest obstacle a plaintiff may encounter. Very
few statutes expressly provide that an injured party may sue. 1' The end
result is that an injured plaintiff who belongs to the class protected
by the statute is denied relief."'h The instant decision hampers the po-
licing of a profession by its members in an area where public health is
certainly involved.
OHIO REVISED CODE SECTION 1.16
The exact number and nature of specific acts which may be termed
"unfair competition" or "unfair trade practices" remains unknown and
undefined. It generally is recognized that the violation of certain criminal
statutes may be a method of unfair competition. The problem is well
stated as follows:
When and to what are the courts willing to recognize the violation of
such legal obligations as acts of unfair competition; under what cir-
cumstances will the violation of a statutory duty give rise not only to
a civil action or a criminal prosecution instituted on behalf of the gov-
ernment or those who were intended as the beneficiaries of the statute,
but also to a cause of action instituted by a competitor. 73
The legislature of the State of Ohio has most succinctly stated the
"solution" to the above problem in the Ohio Revised Code section 1.16:
Any one injured in person or property by a criminal act may recover
full damages in a civil action, unless specifically excepted by law.'7 4
The statute purportedly guarantees full recovery in damages in a civil
action to any person where (1) an injury (2) to a property right
(3) proximately caused by the violation of a criminal act can be
-shown. 5 Nothing in the previous enactments of section 1.16 or the
171. It is submitted that such a defense is unwarranted. Where an act is deemed illegal by
-the legislature and plaintiff's injury is eminent or actual he should not be required to wait
for what may be the slow and sometimes unwilling machinery of the law or an administra-
-dve body.
172. The court recognized that the purpose of the statute was to prevent the unskilled from
practicing a profession wherein contagious diseases are possible. Ignoring the unfair methods
of competition aspect, dearly it is to the public benefit to allow the plaintiff to institute an
action. An adjacent property owner, because of proximity, probably could demonstrate an
injury different than that of the general public and thus could sue for an injunction. The com-
petitor who loses only money is deemed socially inferior.
173. 2 CALLMANN 926.
174. CODE § 1.16. (Emphasis added.) The Ohio Constitution provides that "every person,
for injury done him in his land, goods, person, or reputation, shall have remedy .... " OHIO
CoNsT. art. I, § 16, accord, ILL. CoNsT. art. II, § 19. See CIcAGO B.A., THE LAWS OF ILLI-
NOIS RELATING TO COMPE=TION 281 (1960); N.Y.S.B.A., SEcoND REPORT OF THE SPE-
aL CoMMITEE To STUDY THE NEw YORK ANTrRUsT LAws 14a-21a.
175. The various annotations reveal little. See 1 PAGE's OIo REv. CODE ANNOr. 13
(1953), citing Commissioners v. Bank of Findlay, 32 Ohio St. 194 (1877) and Howk v. Min-
nick, 19 Ohio St. 462 (1869). In Commissioners v. Bank of Findlay, supra, the court utilized
a statute making certain acts unlawful which were not so at common law. The statute pro-
vided a specific remedy: a fine to the person injured of double the amount embezzled and
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decisions arising thereunder suggests a different interpretation. The
Ohio judiciary thus is equipped to deal with new forms of unfair trade
practices.'76
Presently, the Ohio judiciary will enjoin penal violations of com-
petitive penal statutes, absent an express grant of authority.17  It also
will enjoin the violation of noncompetitive penal statutes where a "prop-
erty right" is proven.' The existence of a "property right" thus be-
comes the issue. And this test is operable, if at all, only where it is in-
terpreted very liberally. The right to compete in business in absence of
injury proximately caused by a penal violation should be a "property
right." Viewed in this manner, all cases can be reduced to a simple
principle: '79
[Treat] a violation of a penal statute affecting the conduct of business
as an unfair method of competition, enjoinable at the suit of a com-
petitor 80
This principle would recognize that a business relationship exists
imprisonment of the wrongdoer. Held, the remedy given by statute was exclusive. The
court cited the famous quote of Lord Mansfield: " That where a statute creates a new offense
by prohibiting and making unlawful anything which was lawful before, and appoints a specific
remedy against such new offense (not antecedently unlawful), by a particular sanction and a
particular method of proceeding, that particular method of proceeding must be pursued and
none other."' (Rex v. Robinson, 2 Burr. 799, 803 (K.B. 1759) ). Id. at 200-01. In the Howk
case, the court held that the owner whose property had been stolen need not await the com-
mencement of criminal proceedings before instituting a civil suit. Obviously neither case
explains the full import of CODE § 1.16. Nor can this section be construed as limited to the
principle that a tort is not merged in a felony. See Story v. Hammond, 4 Ohio 376 (1831).
Witness the previous wording of § 1.16: "Nothing in Part Fourth [Penal laws] contained shall
be construed to prevent a party injured, in person or property, by any criminal act, from recover-
ing full damages." 74 Ohio Laws 243 (1877), R. S. (Ohio) § 6803 (1882); "Nothing
contained in the penal laws shall prevent anyone injured in person or property, by a criminal
action from recovering full damages, unless specifically excepted by law." OHIO GEN. CODE
§ 12379. It is submitted that the full import of § 1.16 is unknown only because of disuse
and unfamiliarity by members of the bar and the judiciary.
176. An unfortunate result was reached in Hackney v. Fordson Coal Co., 230 Ky. 362,
19 S.W.2d 989 (1929). The statute provides: "A person injured by the violation of any
statute may recover from the offender such damage as he may sustain by reason of the
violation .... " KY. REv. CODE § 446.070 (1963). Defendant paid its employees in scrip
redeemable only at its store in direct violation of a penal statute - an obvious unfair trade
practice. Plaintiff-competitor, having an actual sales loss of $3000, was denied recovery.
Held, only employees could sue as the statute prohibiting scrip was for their benefit. The
court seemingly was unaware of the property right incident to plaintiff's business and the
injury to the consumer when he is denied the opportunity to judge freely. But see CHICAGO
B.A., op. cit. supra note 174. See also 1 CALLMA2N 139.
177. Rennet Brewing Co. v. Rolland, 96 Ohio St. 432, 118 N.E. 118 (1917) (unlawful
refilling of plaintiff's containers by competitor).
178. Dworken v. Apartment House Owners' Ass'n, 38 Ohio App. 265, 176 N.E. 577
(1931) (unlicensed practice of law); Taylor v. New Sys. Prosthetric Dental Lab., Inc., 29
Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 451 (C.P. 1931) (unlicensed practice of dentistry).
179. 2 CALLMANN 949.
180. Handler, Unfair Competition, 21 IOwA L. REv. 175, 236, 290 (1936). (Emphasis
added.) See 2 CALLMANN 949 n.95 (list of cases recognizing the above theory). Professor
Callmann strenuously argues that the "property right" and "intent of statute" test should be dis-
regarded in favor of injury to the "competitive relationship." Id. at 950-51.
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whereby competitors are limited to lawful means of competition. It also
would eliminate traditional defenses of another economic and judicial era
which today serve no useful purpose other than to encourage unlawful
competition.
The fiction of a "property right" proved useful, initially, as the pro-
cedural basis for equity intervention. But it also operates contrary to a
substantive principle of equity of much older duration: a court of equity
will accord relief where an injured plaintiff is without a remedy.
Recognizing competitor relationships would not be without precedent.
The law already accords protection to many relationships, e.g., master
and servant, principal and agent. 8 ' Moreover, it provides a sound basis
for the total doctrine of unfair competition - inequitable conduct which
is enjoined as "unfair competition" even in the absence or presence
of the conventional forms of competition.'82
The judiciary obviously should take a fresh look at any situation
where the violation of a penal statute yields a profit at the expense of a
competitor. As a minimum, the law abiding competitor should be al-
lowed injunctive relief to prevent future losses.
The test of "intent of the statute" only provides a pitfall for the
unwary. Theoretically, a state acts only through its police power, which
is reserved to the protection of public health, safety, and welfare. Vir-
tually every penal statute has as its primary purpose the protection of the
public. Consider one purpose of trademark statutes: to protect the pub-
lic against one businessman substituting his inferior goods for those of a
competitor whom the public respects as a supplier of superior quality
goods. Thus, even the penal statutes specifically intended to regulate
competition are potential victims of the "intent of statute" doctrine.
To discard the "intent of statute" test and the "property right" test
in favor of the business relationship test would not promote monopolies
or greatly increase litigation. First, the penal violation must affect the
business relationship before relief can be granted; second, antitrust law
is a very effective policing agent; and third, the defendant who is en-
joined from committing illegal acts only is forced to comply with the
statute before such action proves detrimental to his law abiding competi-
tor. Allowing injunctive relief as a minimum leaves open the issue of
whether the penal law violator should be forced to respond in damages
for the injuries caused to his law-abiding competitor.'83 It is submitted
181. See 1 CALLMANN 31-41.
182. See Callmann, Unfair Competition Without Competition?, 95 U. PA. L. Ray. 443
(1947). "In the freedom of trade... the property concept is expendable. It may serve a
useful purpose in strengthening the position of the plaintiff by adding the noncompetitive
cause of action for property violation to the competitive one which is derived from the viola-
tion of duties arising out of the competitive relationship." 1 CALLMANN 38.
183. See Patz v. Greene & Co., [1907] TRANsvAAL L. REP. 427 (So. Afr. Sup. Ct.). See
7 TExAs L. REv. 638, 641 n.21 (1928).
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that by reason of the hodgepodge character of the Ohio legislation on
trade regulation, inferences as to the availability or unavailability of a
civil remedy under Ohio Revised Code section 1.16 may not be drawn
from the statutory granting or withholding of a civil remedy in connec-
tion with any particular criminal prohibition. As will appear herein-
after, civil damages are granted in connection with some criminal penal-
ties.
The remainder of the note is devoted to a discussion of penal viola-
tions provided in the Ohio Revised Code which, given the proper factual
situation, could involve an allegation of unfair competition. In con-
sidering the various Ohio code sections listed below, it is well to note
that "an injunction against the violation of a penal statute would be
entirely unnecessary if the penalty is adequate and is properly enforced." '184
FALSE AND MISLEADING ADVERTISEMENTS
The judiciary has experienced difficulties 8 in recognizing false and
misleading advertisement as a method of unfair competition.'86 Where
the dishonest competitor untruthfully infers through advertising or the
like that his goods emit from his rival, relief may be obtained. The
basis for an action is generally trademark or tradename infringement and
the wrong is to the rival, i.e., a violation of a "property right" - the
rival's name and good will. Where the dishonest competitor falsely in-
fers the quality or capabilities of his own product, the wrong is considered
a public wrong via the duped consumer, not an invasion of any "property
right" of the rival. 8 ' And, in many instances, the remedies of even the
duped consumer are illusory.
1 88
184. 2 CALLMANN 956-57 nn.34 & 35, citing Corchine v. Henderson, 70 S.W.2d 766 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1934) (district attorney joined because penal statute did not afford an adequate
remedy); State ex rel. Taylor v. Iola Theater Corp., 136 Kan. 411, 415, 15 P.2d 459, 461
(1932) (dissent: "Probably the profits they had derived from the operation of the theater
left a good margin after paying the fines imposed."). See also People ex rel. Shepardson v.
Universal Chiropractors Ass'n, 302 111. 228, 134 N.E. 4 (1922) in which fifty-two un-
licensed chiropractors formed an association to collect dues to pay fines, costs, and attorney's
fees incurred in defending the members.
185. "The need for a dear-cut theory of unfair competition is particularly manifest in the
field of false and misleading advertising. Because the courts have not yet evolved a concept
of unfair competition consistent with the understanding of the honest trademan, they have
almost completely abdicated their positions as arbiters of original jurisdiction. The cases
that evidence this development make sad reading indeed." 1 CALLMANN 297. The leading
case is American Washboard Co. v. Saginaw Mfg. Co., 103 Fed. 281 (6th Cir. 1900).
186. See generally Callmann, False Advertising as a Competitive Tort, 48 COLUm. L. REV.
876 (1948); Dyer, False and Misleading Advertising, 41 TRADEMARK REP. 9 (1951); Rey-
nolds, Legal Curbs on Advertising, 50 TRADEMARK REP. 394 (1960); See also SIMON, THE
LAW FOR ADVERTISEMENT AND MARKETING (1956).
187. The issue is basic in that, traditionally, equity would issue injunctions only to protect
"property rights." See discussion p. 139-41 supra.
188. See Dyer, supra note 186, at 10.
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General Prohibitions
Generally, the courts which have granted relief to the rival have re-
quired proof of a "property right"; that is, the existence of a customer
who the dishonest competitor has secured by falsely describing his goods,
and who would have purchased from the complainant if the dishonest
competitor had been truthful.' The practicalities and probabilities of
sustaining such a burden of proof are readily apparent.'"
The judiciary obviously disliked its solution requiring the rival to
show the loss of a "sure" sale.' It felt, however, that the legislature
should provide the remedy.' "[L] egislative efforts to protect honest
competition and the public were inevitable,"' 3 but the results have been
largely negative.
94
The statutes generally prohibit misrepresentations of fact. Convic-
tions have been dismissed summarily merely by alluding to the advertise-
ments as statements of opinion,"' or promissory statements,"' and not
false advertisements. Moreover, because the statutes are penal in nature,
the tendency has been for strict and narrow construction."' Thus the
judiciary, while disliking its own solution, has not looked with favor
upon the legislature's.
The quandary of the legislature is not unreal. The judiciary quickly
enforces legislative intent directed against the more flagrant misrepre-
sentations, such as those found in the food and drug acts. The obvious
purpose of the statutes is the protection of public health and welfare
through a valid exercise of police power.'9' These areas, however, gen-
189. Ely-Norris Safe Co. v. Mosler Safe Co., 7 F.2d 603 (2nd Cir. 1925), rev'd, 273
U.S. 132 (1927).
190. 1 CALLMANN 303. Cf. American Philatelic Soc'y v. Claibourne, 3 Cal. 2d 689, 46
P.2d 135 (1935); Motor Improvements v. A. C. Spark Plug Co., 80 F.2d 385 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 298 U.S. 671 (1936).
191. An exception to the rule that equity would not enjoin false statements concerning a
product arose in cases of product description by geographical location. Obviously, the honest
competitor had not lost a "sure" sale. The courts granted relief, however, but on the basis
of passing off. See Gage-Downs Co. v. Featherbone Corset Co., 83 Fed. 213 (W.D. Mich.
1897). For a discussion of this exception see 1 CALLMANN 299; Handler, False and Mis-
7eading Advertisement, 39 YALE L.J. 22, 37-38 (1929).
192. American Washboard Co. v. Saginaw Mfg. Co., 103 Fed. 281, 284-85 (6th Cir.
1900). "Absent special legislation or evidence of disparagement or an intent to drive a
competitor out of business, the Washboard decision has, with few modifications, remained
the law of the land." 1 CALLMANN 300. (Citations omitted.)
193. 1 CALLMANN 309. For a digest of approximately 2,000 state statutes, see RoPER,
STATE ADVRTISING LEGISLATION (1945). See N.Y.S.B.A., op. cit. sapra note 174, at 7a.
See also CHIcAGo B.A. op. cit. supra note 174.
194. 1 CALLMANN 309-14. Therein the author criticizes the ease with which the statutes
may be avoided.
195. People v. Clarke, 252 App. Div. 122, 297 N.Y. Supp. 776 (1937).
196. People ex rel. Zvirin v. Roxy Theatre, Inc., 8 N.Y.S.2d 92 (Magis. Ct. 1938).
197. People v. Schecter, 257 App. Div. 813, 12 N.Y.S.2d 781 (1939).
198. "[Judicial thinking has been molded by the still fascinating influence of the antiquated
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erally are far removed from the area of unfair competition. Where the
legislature desires to legislate in the area of unfair competition, however,
and provides penal provisions, the judiciary seems less willing to enforce
the same.' 9
Analysis of the situation in Ohio begins with consideration of its
statutory prohibition against fraudulent advertisement."' The original
enactment, passed in 1913, °1 has given way to a recent amendment.
0 2
The amended statute seemingly indicates an attempt to eliminate a point
of confusion in prior case law. 03 Specifically, the new statute excuses
"such advertisement made in good faith without knowledge of its false,
deceptive, or misleading character., 2 4  Hopefully, the new statute will
place the burden of proof of good faith upon the advertiser.
The statute has been utilized in five cases, all of which were prose-
cuted by the state.20 ' Research failed to reveal any recorded case where
a third party competitor availed himself of the statute. A possible ra-
tionalization is that the code provides that any prosecutor may bring
forms of action, that the courts are loath to deal with the realistic impact of advertising in
trade, and that they have failed to appreciate the fact that advertising, if indeed it is an evil,
is a necessary incident of our capitalistic economy." 1 CALLMANN 306-07. (Citations omit-
ted.) Professor Callmann considers and rejects (1) mere moral wrong, (2) business cen-
sorship, and (3) flood of private litigation as sound reasons for denying the honest competitor
relief. Id. at 305-06.
199. The problem is surprisingly shrouded in principles of constitutional law and funda-
mentals. Both the federal and state governments exercise commerce and police power. The
federal government exercises an express commerce power over competition and a disguised
police power derived from the commerce clause. The states, not having an express com-
merce power, have derived one from their police power. The success of the complaintant
depends in many instances on the "intent" of the statute. To summarily state as the basis
of a decision that the statute merely is a valid exercise of police power in regulating public
health, safety, peace, or morals without examination of statutory intent obviously is wrong.
First, competition necessarily is exercised through a state's police power; and second, the intent
of the statute possibly could be directed at regulation of both public health and competition.
Clearly many statutory offenses exist because of the efforts of competitors and not because of
the possible future victim's existance in the public at large. For an excellent discussion of
the constitutional issues involved, see 1 CALLMANN 158-208. Whether statutory "intent" is
the best test to determine whether a penal violation is an act of unfair competition is con-
sidered p. 142 supra.
200. CODE § 2911.41 (Supp. 1962).
201. OHIO GEN. CODE § 13193-2.
202. CODE § 2911.41 (Supp. 1962). The penalty is a fine of not less than $200 nor more
than $1000 and/or twenty days imprisonment.
203. Rosenblatt v. Cleveland, 20 Ohio L. Abs. 106 (Ct. App. 1935) (scienter is a necessary
element, no discussion of case law); Straum v. State, 15 Ohio App. 32 (1921) (intention to
deceive not an element, used victrolas, falsely advertised as new via sign); State v. Lubell, 28
Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 155 (Toledo Munic. Ct. 1930) (radio sets for $49 less $25 trade-in falsely
advertised via newspaper); State v. Schaengold, 13 OHIO L. REP. 130 (Cincinnati Munic. Ct.
1915) (scienter not required, $30 suits falsely advertised for $12 via newspaper); cf. Brosious
v. State, 29 OHIO L. REP. 174 (Ct. App. 1929) ($2 weekly salary falsely advertised as $25,
via newspaper). See Dunsmore, Advertised-Product Liability: Advertising Law and Product
Liability, 8 CLEV.-MAK L. REv. 62 (1961).
204. CODE § 2911.41 (Supp. 1962).
205. See note 18 supra.
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suit to enjoin fraudulent advertisements." 6 Moreover, the code also





Apart from the general prohibition against false advertising, other
provisions in the Ohio Revised Code forbid false advertisement in specific
industries or concerning certain products. Frozen desserts may not be
advertised for sale if they contain any non-natural fats, oils, or paraffin."'
Also, "fresh eggs" must conform to certain standards before they may be
advertised and sold as such.2 09
Agricultural Seeds
The legislature also has been active in the area of seeds. In a
most concise fashion, the code defines "advertisements, 2 10 "false label-
ing,"211 and "false advertisement."2 2  The code prohibits the use of the
words "certified" or "registered" where such is false. 3 Words such as
"State tested" or "State" may not be used when advertising.1 4 It also
forbids unlawful sale of seeds, and includes sales where a false or mis-
leading advertisement has been used.15 Furthermore, "no person shall
disseminate any false or misleading advertisement concerning agricul-
tural or vegetable seed."2 '  The director of agriculture enforces the
above provisions.217
Naval Stores
The code forbids the use of any false or misleading means in the
sale of "naval stores' '218 or Similar goods.2 19  Advertising turpentine or
206. CODE § 2911.42.
207. CoDE § 119.061 (Supp. 1962).
208. CODE § 3717.52. The penalty is a fine of $100 to $500. CODE § 3717.99(N).
209. Code § 925.02 (Supp. 1962). The Ohio Department of Agriculture must enforce
the code. CODE § 925.04 (Supp. 1962). The penalty is a fine of $25 to $50 for the first
offense; $50 to $100 for a second offense; and $100 to $200 for a third offense. CODE
§ 925.99(A) (Supp. 1962). In 1959, the legislature enacted the section "Advertising Re-
quirements." CODE § 925.023 (Supp. 1962).
210. CODE § 907.01(I) (Supp. 1962).
211. CODE § 907.01(T) (1) (Supp. 1962).
212. CODE § 907.01 (T) (2) (Supp. 1962).
213. CODE 5 907.02.
214. CODE § 907.05.
215. CODE § 907.06(A) (3) (Supp. 1962).
216. CODE § 907.06(B) (2) (Supp. 1962).
217. CODE § 907.08(A). Enforcement extends to CODE §§ 907.01-.14. A violation is
punishable by fine: up to $100 for the first offense; up to $250 for subsequent offenses.
218. Naval stores is defined as spirits of turpentine and rosin. CODE § 3741.01 (A).
219. CODE § 3741.04(D).
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rosin in other than naval stores is forbidden."' The prohibition section
enumerates the following products as protected from false advertising:
"paints, mixed paints and similar compounds, naval stores, linseed oil
or white lead." '221
MISREPRESENTATION OF PRODUCTS
Generally
Closely related to the area of false advertisement is a dealer's mis-
representation of product. Wrongs such as adulteration of goods and
" eshore weights are examples. Clearly, such techniques are harmful to
the public. Moreover, the honest competitor is at a serious disadvantage
when competing with another retailer who sells the same goods, but
who gives a short amount so as to increase his profit margin.
Specific Products
Petroleum
The variety of statutes prohibiting adulteration indicate piecemeal
legislation, probably resulting from the pressures of various lobbying
groups. Products protected include petroleum, wool, and crockery.
The code prohibits misrepresentation in the storage or sale of petroleum
products.2 The prohibition protects the nature, quality, or identity of
products sold or offered for sale.2  Aiders and abettors are treated as
principle offenders. 4
Tobacco
The code also prohibits placing foreign substances in tobacco pack-
ages.2"' The seriousness of the legislature is beyond question, the penalty
being as much as six months imprisonment. It is further provided that
the wrongdoer will "be liable in damages to the person injured for the
amount of such injury." '  This is an excellent example of piecemeal
legislation. Section 1.16 of the code also provides a civil remedy for
injury proximately caused through the violation of any penal statute.
220. CODE § 3741.04(C).
221. CODE § 3741.07. The penalty is a fine up to $50 for the first offense; and $50 to
$100 in fines and/or thirty to one hundred days inprisonment for subsequent offenses. CODE
5 3741.99(A).
222. CODE § 3741.17.
223. Ibid. The penalty is a fine of not less than $100 and not more than $200 and/or up to
thirty days imprisonment for the first offense; and not less than $200 and not more than $500
and/or six months imprisonment for subsequent offenses. CODE § 3741.99 (F) (Supp. 1962).
224. CODE § 3741.24 (Supp. 1962).
225. CODE § 2911.24.
226. Ibid.
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Wool
The sale of wool where foreign substances are contained within the
fleece is prohibited.2 Case law indicates that a successful prosecution
requires the indictment to aver that the fleeces were wrapped in a manner
calculated to defraud, and it must describe the substances alleged to have
been concealed in the fleeces.2
28
Crockery Ware and Pedigrees
The adulteration of materials used in the manufacture of crockery
ware is prohibited. 9 An act in violation of the statute must be done
"purposely and maliciously," and the statute forbids the addition of "co-
balt, soap, salt, sand, earth, or other material which tends to adulterate
or injure it."23 Violators are subject to one to seven years imprisonment!
Finally, the code forbids the willful use of a false pedigree or false
certificate of sale for purposes of deceiving.2 '
Weights and Measures
Similar to the antiadulteration statutes are those controlling weights
and measures. It is dear that legislative interest in either of these areas
is concerned primarily with protecting the public rather than with regu-
lating competition. Yet it is hard to imagine a more substantial method
of unfair competition than where one competitor may increase his profit
by ten or twenty per cent, and thus increase his business capital and op-
portunities by secretly selling short amounts.
A false or short weight is prohibited."2 Case law indicates that in-
tent or knowledge is not a necessary element of the offense of selling by
false or short weight." 3 Generally, the weight must be marked on the
package. '
The code defines the standard weight of a bushel and lists twenty-
two commodities and their bushel weight." 5 The articles therein defined
"shall, when dealt in by the bushel, be bought and sold upon such actual
227. CODE § 2911.25. The penalty is a $25 to $100 fine and/or thirty to ninety days im-
prisonment.
228. Hogue v. State, 3 Ohio C.C.R. (n.s.) 315 (Cir. Ct. 1902).
229. CODE § 2911.33.
230. Ibid.
231. CODE § 2911.20. The penalty is a fine of $25 to $500 and/or six months imprison-
ment.
232. CODE § 1327.42. The penalty is a fine up to $500. CODE § 1327.99(G).
233. State v. Weisberg, 74 Ohio App. 91, 55 N.E.2d 870 (1943).
234. CODE § 1327.43. The penalty is a $25 to $500 fine. CODE § 1327.99(H).
235. CODE § 1327.17.
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bulk weights."2 ' Wheat dealt with by a separate statute must be sold
by standard measurement." 7 Solid foods of certain types must be sold
only by weight or by count, depending upon their nature." 8 Other solid
foods, such as wheat and cornflour, unless sold in bulk, must be sold in
standard weights or containers."
MISREPRESENTATION OF CHARACTER OF STATUS OF BUSINESS
Generally
Misrepresentation within this area may occur in a variety of forms.
The more obvious forms include misrepresentation as to the size, age, or
nature of businesses.24° Within Ohio, regulation is directed primarily at
business corporations and financial institutions. A typical financial regu-
lation which is penal in nature provides that an unauthorized person shall
not represent that he can transmit money or its equivalent to a foreign
country.24' Also, all persons, firms, or corporations engaged in the sale
of transportation services to foreign countries must post a bond with the
state auditor prior to commencing business. 2
Specific Business Regulations
Banks
The code prohibits anyone from publishing "a false statement or
report relating to the financial condition of a bank with the intent to de-
fraud or injure it or another person or corporation." '  Bank personnel
are prohibited from accepting funds as a deposit where it is known that
236. Ibid. The penalty is a fine of up to $100 and/or not more than six months imprison-
meat. CODE § 1327.99(A). Further, the president of a corporation or company who vio-
lates § 1327.17 may be imprisoned for six months.
237. CODE § 1377.18. The penalty is a fine of $25 to $100 and/or thirty days imprison-
ment. CODE § 1377.99(B). The constitutionality of this statute has been questioned in
Yeazill v. State, 20 Ohio C.C.R. (Cir. Ct. 1898). The court reasoned that as the statute
protected only the original producer of the wheat, this was an unreasonable discrimination
and not a reasonable classification.
238. CODE § 1327.19. The penalty is a fine of $25 to $50 for the first offense; $50 to $100
for a second offense; and $100 to $200 for subsequent offenses. CODE § 1327.99(F).
239. CODE § 1327.41. The penalty is a $25 to $500 fine. CODE § 1327.99(F).
240. 1 CALLMANN 368-79.
241. CODE § 1115.17. The penalty provides a $5000 maximum fine and/or ten years im-
prisonment. CODE § 1115.99(A) (Supp. 1962).
242. CODE § 1115.18(A). The penalty provides a $500 maximum fine and/or six months
imprisonment. CODE § 1115.99(B) (Supp. 1962).
243. CODE § 1115.19. The penalty provided is a $10,000 maximum fine and/or one to
thirty years imprisonment. CODE § 1115.99(C) (Supp. 1962). The statute is directed at
officers, employees, agents, and directors. The case law under this statute reveals prosecu-
tions for embezzlement and misapplication of funds only.
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the bank is insolvent244  In Pavey v. Fulton245 a depositor who could
prove a violation of this statute nevertheless was not given a superior
right to the refund of his deposit. He had failed to state a cause of action'!
Rather, he belonged in the same class as other depositors because of the
absence of a "legislative intent" to import special protection.24 Ohio
Revised Code section 1.16 was not considered. Obviously, section 1.16
would have permitted recovery in this instance if it has any effect at all.
The code also provides that "no bank shall advertise by newspaper,
letterhead, or in any other way, a larger capital than has actually been
paid in." '48 Clearly this section is intended to prevent banks from securing
confidence from the investing public to which they are not entitled.
Finally, banks not organized under the laws of Ohio cannot use the word
"State" as a portion of their name or title.24
Loan Associations
Chapter 1153 of the code is directed against building and loan as-
sociations. Any declaration of a greater dividend than actually has been
earned, for "the purpose of deceiving the people or defrauding the mem-
bers of the association," is forbidden. 250
The code also forbids solicitation of businesses by loan associa-
tions.2 ' A remedy is provided, in that violators of sections 1153.02
through 1153.06 "shall be liable to the person injured to the extent of
damage incurred." '252  If section 1.16 has any effect, why have section
1153.06? Is this merely an inadvertent product of piecemeal legislation?
Upon consummation of each sale, an itemized statement of sales must be.
kept. "3 It also is illegal for anyone to "wilfully render any false item-
244. CODE § 1115.21. The penalty is a maximum fine of $5000 and/or one to five years
imprisonment. CODE § 1115.99(E) (Supp. 1962).
245. 45 Ohio App. 377, 187 N.E. 198 (1933).
246. Cf. Orme & Oakey v. Baker, 74 Ohio St. 337, 78 N.E. 439 (1906) (right of depositor
to recover deposit made shortly before insolvency as a preferred creditor).
247. For other prohibitive practices in banking, see Annor., 81 A.L.R.2d 1280 (1962) (pay-
ments under ostensibly independent contract as usury); Annot., 57 A-L.R.2d 630 (1958)
(taking or charging interest in advance as usury).
248. CODE § 1115.24. Penalty is a $500 fine per offense and such is forfeited to the state.
No case law is revealed under this statute. Cf. CODE § 2911.03 (Supp. 1962) (false state-
ment concerning financial ability); CODE § 2911.30 (publishing false prospectus).
249. CODE 5 1115.25. The penalty is a $50 fine per offense, which is forfeited to the state.
250. Code 5 1153.03. The penalty is one to ten years imprisonment. CODE § 1153.99(A).
CODE § 1153.05 forbids aiding and abetting.
251. CODE § 1153.06. The penalty for solicitation is a $500 fine and/or six months im-
prisonment. CODE § 1153.99(B).
252. CODE 5 1153.07.
253. CODE 5 4711.01.
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ized account....254 The above discussed statutes are for the most part
devoid of judicial interpretation.
MISREPRESENTATION OF PROFESSION
General Protection
Comparatively, this area of unfair competition has undergone sub-
stantial development. This is primarily due to the franchise or license
theory. The judiciary generally recognizes a "property right" in a fran-
chise or license in certain areas which equity will protect.-5  The Ohio
legislature has been quite active in the regulation of professions and oc-
cupations. Again, however, case law is at a minimum regarding the
amount of protection which any individual occupation or profession may
receive from the judiciary when competition exists from persons who
have not complied with the regulations.
Specific Professions
Accountants
Accountants are protected from the competition of those not pos-
sessing valid certificates.5" The code further forbids false advertisement,
such as use of the letters "CPA" or symbols of similar import,257 and
prohibits the unlawful practice of accounting. 58  The code specifically
provides an injunctive remedy.5 9 It is to be noted that false advertise-
ment does not carry a penalty. The unlawful practice prohibition, how-




The statutes regulating architects demonstrate a second method of
protection commonly employed by the legislature. One section is named
"Prohibitions," and it provides that all other sections within the chapter
shall not be violated.2"  This method contrasts with prescribing penal-
ties selectively throughout the chapter, as is done with accounting.
254. CODE § 4711.03. The penalty is a $10 to $200 fine. CODE § 4711.99(A).
255. See 2 CALLMANN § 63.2(b). The areas most generally protected are medicine and
law. E.g., Seifert v. Buhl Optical Co., 276 Mich. 692, 268 N.W. 784 (1936) (optometrist);
Kentucky State Bd. of Dental Examiners v. Payne, 213 Ky. 382, 281 S.W. 188 (1926)
(dentist).
256. CODE 5 4701.14 (Supp. 1962).
257. CODE § 4701.12 (Supp. 1962).
258. CODE § 4701.14 (Supp. 1962).
259. CODE § 4701.18 (Supp. 1962).
260. CODE § 4701.99 (Supp. 1962).
261. CODE § 4703.19. The penalty is monetary only, a $50 to $200 fine for a first of-
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Attorneys
Attorneys also are given substantial protection. False representation
as an attorney is forbidden.6 2  Also, compensation for procurement of
legal services is prohibited.26 The unlawful practice of law has been
recognized as a method of unfair competition." 4 The judiciary has rea-
soned that an equitable remedy is allowable over and above a legal
remedy, 65 and equity will afford the legal profession protection from
lay competition. 66
Auctioneers, Barbers and Astrologists
Auctioneers must procure licenses.267 Barbers must possess certifi-
cates of registration.26 8 Any attempt to obtain a certificate or practice
barbering by fraudulent misrepresentation is forbidden,6 9 as is barbering
on Sunday.' The practices of astrology, fortune telling, clairvoyance,
and palmistry also require licensing."1
Commission Merchants and Cosmetologists
Commission merchants must use accounting forms 2  Cosmetolo-
gists must be licensed,27 and falsely representing oneself as such is pun-
ishable 4  Practice of cosmetology in any room used for residential pur-
poses is prohibited.275 Debt pooling companies must operate under a
license,276 and stiff penalties are imposed for non-compliance 7
fense and a $50 to $500 fine for a second offense. See Annot., 82 A.LR.2d 1013 (1962)
(acts amounting to architectural services).
262. CODE § 4705.07 (penalty - $25 to $500 fine).
263. CODE § 4705.08 (Supp. 1962). The penalty is a $100 to $1000 fine and/or thirty
days imprisonment. CODE § 4705.99 (B) (Supp. 1962). See Warren, Solicitatio of Legal
Services - a Crime, 22 OHIO ST. L.J. 691 (1960).
264. See Dworkin v. Apartment House Owners' Ass'n, 38 Ohio App. 265, 176 N.E. 577
(1931).
265. Ibid.
266. See Goodman v. Western Bank & Trust Co., 28 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 272 (CP. 1928).
267. CODE § 4707.01 (penalty - $100 to $500 fine).
268. CODE § 4709.08.
269. CODE § 4709.22(B), (C) (penalty - $25 to $200 fine). CoDE S 4709.99(A).
270. CODE § 4709.24. The penalty is not less than a $15 fine for the first offense and $20
to $30 in fines and/or twenty to thirty days imprisonment for multiple offenses. CODE §
4709.99 (B).
271. CODE § 2911.16. The penalty is a $25 to $100 fine or imprisonment for thirty to
ninety days or both.
272. CODE § 4711.99. The penalty is a $10 to $200 fine.
273. CODE § 4713.20.
274. Ibid.
275. CODE § 4713.21. The penalty for violating either CODE § 4713.20 or CODE 5 4713.21
is a $10 to $100 fine.
276. CODE § 4710.02 (Supp. 1962).
277. CODE § 4710.99 (Supp. 1962). (Penalty - $50 to $1000 fine and/or for thirty days
to six months imprisonment.)
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Dentists
Dentists must possess a license... and this license must be dis-
played.279 Further, a dentist may practice only under an individual
name.2"' Employment of an unlicensed dentist is unlawful 8' as is any
misrepresentation, impersonation, or submission of a false application."
A dental hygienist is held to certain qualifications288 and false or counter-
feit documents are unlawful.284 The use of a diploma or license with
intent to defraud also is punishable. 85
Funeral Directors and Gristmillers
There is a prohibition against engaging in the business of embalming
and funeral directing unless duly licensed.286 And unlicensed embalming
is forbidden.8  Gristmillers also are regulated.288  Assumedly, the pro-
hibition against excessive tolls is for the protection of the public.2"
Nurses
Nurses must meet certain requirements... and may not practice with-
out a current license.29' Unqualified persons may not represent them-
selves as "registered nurses" or use the letters "R.N."'292 Nor may such
persons represent themselves as a "licensed practical nurse" or use the
letters "L.P.N."'293 No person may sell or fraudulently obtain or furnish
any nursing diploma, license, or registration. 94
278. CODE § 4715.09(A) (Supp. 1962).
279. CODE § 4715.17.
280. CODE § 4715.18 (Supp. 1962) (subject to §§ 1785.01-.08).
281. CODE § 4715.19. The penalty is a $100 to $500 fine for the first offense; subsequent
offenses, $500 fine or imprisonment from ten to ninety days. CODE § 4715.99(C).
282. Ibid.
283. CODE § 4715.29 (penalty - $100 to $200 fine). CODE § 4715.99 (D).
284. CODE § 4715.31 (penalty - one to twenty years imprisonment). CODE § 4715.99(E).
285. CODE § 4715.32. The penalty is a $100 to $500 fine for first offenses; subsequent
offenses, $500 fine or imprisonment from ten to ninety days. CODE § 4715.99(C).
286. CODE § 4717.12 (penalty - $50 to $250 fine). CODE § 4717.99(A).
287. CODE S 4717.13. The penalty is a $40 to $75 fine for the first offense and $50 to
$100 in fines and/or six months imprisonment for subsequent offenses.
288. CODE § 4719.01.
289. CODE § 4719.02. A fine of $20 is imposed. CODE § 4719.99.
290. CODE § 4723.08 (Supp. 1962).
291. CODE § 4723.26 (Supp. 1962).
292. CODE § 4723.36 (Supp. 1962).
293. CODE § 4723.37 (Supp. 1962).
294. CODE § 4723.38 (Supp. 1962). The penalty for violating §§ 4723.08, .26, .36-.38 is
a $100 to $500 fine and/or ninety days imprisonment. CODE § 4723.99.
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Optometrists
The practice of optometry requires a license.295 An individual has
been allowed to sue to enjoin the unlawful practice of optometry.2" The
purpose of the statute, however, is to protect the public from the unskilled
and not to prevent unfair competition."' In practice, therefore, only
"valuable" licenses are the subject of unfair competition actions.
Pawnbrokers
Pawnbrokers are subject to regulation.9 8 A common penalty is pro-
vided for any violation of the code relating to pawnbrokers. 9 Revoca-
tion of a license also is possible."'0
Pharmacists
Pharmacists must have certificates and must display the same.3"1 Re-
tail drug stores must be conducted by legally registered pharmacists.3 °2
The selling of drugs by non-registered persons is forbidden.303  Swearing
falsely before the State Board of Pharmacy is a felony,0 4 as is the use of
fraudulent certificates.0 5 Penalties also are provided for the unlawful
sale of "dangerous" drugs.300
295. CODE § 4725.02. Penalty is a $500 fine for the first offense and $500 to $1000 and/or
six months to one year imprisonment for subsequent offenses. CoDE § 4725.99.
296. Rowe v. Standard Drug Co., 132 Ohio St. 629, 9 N.E.2d 609 (1937).
297. Kahn v. Shaw, 65 Ga. App. 563, 16 S.E.2d 99 (1941). See Note, 8 CLEV.-MAR. 1.
REV. 263 (1959).
298. CODE §§ 4727.01-.99.
299. CoDE § 4727.99. The penalty is a $50 to $200 fine for the first offense, and not more
than a $500 fine and/or six months imprisonment for subsequent offenses.
300. CODE § 4727.16. The responsibility of enforcement is given to the division of se-
curities. CODE § 4227.14. It is open to question whether an individual could bring suit.
301. CODE § 4729.22 (Supp. 1962). The penalty is five to twenty days imprisonment.
Each day's violation constitutes a separate offense. CODE § 4729.99 (A) (Supp. 1962).
302. CODE § 4729.27. This statute was upheld as a valid exercise of police power in State
v. Knecht, 28 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 1 (P. Ct. 1930).
303. CODE § 4729.28.
304. CODE § 4729.35 (penalty - one to three years imprisonment). CODE § 4729.99 (D)
(Supp. 1962). An example of piece-meal legislating is found in CODE ch. 4729. Require-
ments for the sale and advertising of alcohol are stated in CODE §§ 4729.32-.34 and are hardly
related to pharmacy.
305. CODE § 4729.61 (Supp. 1962). The penalty is a $100 to $300 fine for the first of-
fense and $300 to $500 in fines for subsequent offenses. CODE § 4729.99 (F) (Supp. 1962).
306. CODE § 4729.51(A), (B), (D), (E) (Supp. 1962). The penalty is a $50 to $100
fine for the first offense and $100 to $300 in fines for subsequent offenses. CODE 5
4729.99(E) (Supp. 1962).
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Physicians
Physicians are treated extensively. The practice of medicine or sur-
gery,307 midwifery,"'8 or osteopathy309 without a certificate is prohibited.
Filing a false diploma or forged affidavit,310 or swearing falsely31" ' before
the state board is forbidden. Issuing 312 or selling"" a false medical
diploma also is forbidden. A physician may neither issue a false certifi-
cate of disability314 nor make an unlawful prescription for intoxicating
liquors.315 A chiropodist is regulated in his advertisement,31 but no pen-
alty is provided. He must, however, under penalty, have a certificate.
1 7
Physical Therapists
Physical therapists must be registered; 8' the non-registered are pro-
hibited from representing themselves as such by using such letters as
"Ph." or "P.T."31  Fraud or deception in applying for a certificate is
prohibited.1
2 1
Professional Engineers and Real Estate Brokers
Professional engineers must be registered.32' Real estate brokers
must be licensed 22 and only the licensed may advertise as such.32  Illegal
307. CODE § 4731.41. The penalty is a fine of $25 to $500 for the first offense and $50 to
$500 in fines and/or thirty days to one year imprisonment for subsequent offenses. CODE
§ 4731.99(A) (Supp. 1962).
308. CODE§ 4731.42 (penalty- fine of $25 to $100). CODE § 4731.99(B) (Supp. 1962).
309. CODE § 4731.43. The penalty is a $25 to $500 fine and/or thirty days to one year
imprisonment. CODE § 4731.99(C) (Supp. 1962).
310. CODE § 4731.44. The penalty is one to five years imprisonment. CODE § 4731.99(D)
(Supp. 1962).
311. CODE § 4731.45. The penalty is one to five years imprisonment. CODE § 4731.99 (D)
(Supp. 1962).
312. CODE § 4731.46. The penalty is a $100 to $1000 fine and/or one to three years im-
prisonment.
313. CODE § 4713.47. The penalty is a $100 to $1000 fine and/or one to three years
imprisonment.
314. CODE § 4731.48 (penalty- up to a fine of $50). CODE 54731.99(F) (Supp. 1962).
315. CODE § 4731.49. The penalty is a fine of $200 to $500 for the first offense and $500
to $1000 in fines for -ubsequent offenses. CODE § 4731.99(G) (Supp. 1962).
316. CODE § 4731.59 (Supp. 1962).
317. CODE § 4731.60. The penalty is a fine of $25 to $500 and/or thirty days to one year
imprisonment. CODE § 4731.99(H) (Supp. 1962).
318. CODE § 4731.73(A) (Supp. 1962). The penalty is a fine of $25 to $500 and/or
thirty days to one year imprisonment.
319. CODE § 4731.73(B) (Supp. 1962).
320. CODE § 4731.72 (Supp. 1962). The penalty is a $25 to $500 fine and/or thirty days
to one year imprisonment. CODE § 4731.99(1) (Supp. 1962).
321. CODE § 4733.22. The penalty is a fine of $100 to $500 and/or nor more than ninety
days imprisonment. CODE § 4733.99(A) (Supp. 1962).
322. CODE § 4735.02 (Supp. 1962). The penalty is a $25 to $1000 fine and/or one year
imprisonment. CODE § 4735.99(A) (Supp. 1962).
323. Ibid.
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commissions may lead to license revocation,... no further penalty being
provided. Any guarantee of resale profit on the sale of cemetery lots also
is forbidden.3 25
Second Hand Dealers and Steam Engineers
Second hand dealers have prescribed duties326  under threat of
penalty.3 27 The code expressly forbids dealing with minors or dealing
at certain hours.3 21 Steam engineers must exhibit a license 2 and any
violation of Chapter 4739 of the code incurs a penalty.33 °
Veterinarians
Veterinarians must have a license331 procured in absence of fraud.
32
The code contains certain health requirements 33 and forbids any false




The Ohio Legislature regulates the branding and labeling of many
products, primarily those items for human consumption. In addition,
many miscellaneous sections of the Ohio Revised Code are devoted to the
branding and labeling of such non-food items as silver and bedding.
This section of the note will point out regulatory sections pertaining to
324. CODE § 4735.20 (Supp. 1962).
325. CODE § 4735.22. The penalty is a fine of $100 to $1000 and/or six months imprison-
ment. CODE § 4735.99(B).
326. CODE § 4731.01. See Anno., 45 A.LR.2d 1391 (1956).
327. CODE § 4737.99.
328. CODE 5 4737.03.
329. CODE 5 4739.08 (penalty - up to a fine of $5). CODE § 4739.99(A).
330. CODE § 4739.09. The penalty for first offenses is a fine up to $15 and for subsequent
offenses, $10 to $100 in fines. CODE § 4739.99(B).
331. CODE § 4741.19 (Supp. 1962). The penalty is a $100 to $300 fine and/or ninety
days imprisonment for the first offense, $300 to $500 in fines and/or five months imprison-
ment for subsequent offenses. CODE § 4741.99 (Supp. 1962).
332. CODE § 4741.18 (Supp. 1962). The penalty is a $100 to $300 fine and/or ninety
days imprisonment for the first offense; $300 to $500 in fines and/or five months imprison-
ment for subsequent offenses. CODE § 4741.99 (Supp. 1962).
333. CODE § 4741.22 (Supp. 1962).
334. CODE § 4741.21 (Supp. 1962). However, no penalty is provided. CI. CODE
4741.27 (Supp. 1962), which limits the use of the name of a prior licensee to two years.
A veterinarian can trade legally on the good name of his predecessor for only two years.
However, no penalty is provided.
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branding and labeling and their applicable penal provisions. It must be
remembered, of course, that these regulations could be used in conjunc-
tion with Ohio Revised Code section 1.16.'
Food
The Ohio Legislature enacted a new provision against misbranding
in 1957 which prohibits the "manufacturing, sale, or delivery, holding or
offering for sale of any food" that is misbranded.2 Food is deemed
"misbranded"3 if, for example, its labeling is false or misleading,4 it is
sold under the name of another food,5 or its container is misleading.6
Bread
In addition to the above general provisions, the code sets forth brand-
ing regulations for special varieties of foods. For instance, bread is spe-
cifically regulated by the code.7 Each loaf of bread must be labeled to
show its weight and the name of its manufacturer. The label must be
either on its wrapper or, in the case of unwrapped bread, by pan impres-
sion or by some other sanitary means. Furthermore, the weight cannot be
less than sixteen ounces per unit.
An injunction was sought unsuccessfully against the enforcement of
the bread weight provision in Wonder Bakeries Co. v. White.8 The plain-
tiff alleged that he was subjected to unfair competition by those who of-
fered larger and hence more attractive loaves under one pound labels.
The court, however, said that even if this practice were unfair, injunction
would not be the proper remedy.9 What the proper remedy would be
never was suggested by the court. Here is an excellent example of
where the civil remedies provided by Ohio Revised Code section 1.16
1. OHIo REV. CODE § 1.16 (hereinafter cited as CODE §) provides a civil remedy for one
injured because of a criminal act. Thus, under a literal interpretation of the statute, any one
may recover damages when a competitor commits an unfair trade practice in violation of a
penal statute. See Part I supra, at 155.
2. CODE § 3715.52 (Supp. 1962). The penalty for violation is a $100 to $300 fine for
the first offense and $300 to $500 in fines and/or imprisonment from thirty to one hundred
days for subsequent offenses. CODE 5 3715.99(A) (Supp. 1962). This statute also pro-
hibits the misbranding of drugs and cosmetics.
3. CODE 5 3715.60 (Supp. 1962). The code specifically lists eleven examples of misbrand-
ing.
4. CODE 5 3715.60(A) (Supp. 1962).
5. CODE 5 3715.60(B) (Supp. 1962).
6. CODE 5 3715.60(C) (Supp. 1962).
7. Ibid; CODE § 911.18. The penalty is a $25 to $100 fine for the first offense and $100
to $300 in fines for subsequent offenses. CODE § 911.99(A). There is no provision for
imprisonment.
8. 3 F. Supp. 311 (S.D. Ohio 1933).
9. Ibid.
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could have been used quite effectively. ° But whether the court would
recognize and apply the full literal meaning of this section in the in-
stant case is a matter of conjecture.
Meats
There are a few provisions applicable to the specific branding or
labeling of meats. A person selling or manufacturing a meat or meat
product with intent to defraud is prohibited from falsely representing it
as "kosher."'" In addition, the fraudulent use of a sign displaying the
word "kosher" is illegal. Another provision requires the disclosure of
horse meat wherever the meat is sold or served for consumption to the
public.' The slaughterer also must label the horse meat as such. 8  All
food products placed in cold storage must be labeled.'
Maple Products
Fraudulent use of the word "maple" on a label in an attempt to sug-
gest that the contents are actually maple syrup or maple sugar is pro-
hibited.'" In complying with this prohibition, the packer must affix his
name and address to any article sold as maple syrup or, maple sugar. 6
Soft Drinks
The labeling of soft drinks also is covered by statute. 7 The label of
a product which uses synthetic flavors must show that it is "artificially
flavored."'" The statute also requires that certain phrases be placed on
the label or on a placard whenever imitation fruit flavor 9 or artificial
coloring" is used. Injunctive relief against the unauthorized use of labels
on bottles may be obtained."'
10. See note 1 supra.
11. CODE § 1329.29. The penalty provided by CODE § 1329.99 (B) is a fine of $25 to $500.
12. CODE § 919.07. A $100 to $1000 fine and/or thirty days to fifteen months imprison-
ment is the penalty for the violation of this statute. CODE § 919.99.
13. CODE § 919.03. The penalty is the same as the penalty for violation of CODE § 919.07,
supra note 12.
14. CODE § 915.05. The penalty for this section calls for a fine not to exceed $500 for
the first offense and not to exceed $1000 and/or thirty to ninety days imprisonment for sub-
sequent offenses. CODE § 915.99 (Supp. 1962).
15. CODE § 3715.26. The fine for vioirtion is $50 to $200. CODE § 3715.99(H) (Supp.
1962).
16. CODE § 3715.27. The penalty in CODE § 3715.99(H) (Supp. 1962), supra note 15,
is applicable to this statute as well.
17. CODE § 913.25.
18. CODE § 913.25(A).
19. CODE § 913.25 (B).
20. CODE § 913.25(E).
21. CODE § 913.25(F).
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Vinegar
Specifically prohibited is the brand of vinegar which is not in accord-
ance with the standards set forth in the statute.2" A fine of $50 to $100
and imprisonment for thirty to one-hundred days may be imposed for
violation of this statute.2" In various sections of the foregoing chapter,
the code describes in great detail labeling requirements for such vinegars
as wine,24 malt,2" and cider.2"
Eggs
In 1959, the Ohio Legislature enacted stricter requirements encom-
passing advertising, labeling, and grading of eggs.2" For example, the
package must contain an accurate statement of the quantity, size, and
grade of the eggs.
Dairy Products
Labeling and branding regulations are treated extensively in the code's
chapter on dairy products. The code specifically prohibits a person from
selling or possessing a dairy product or imitation thereof which falsely
states the place of processing, name, cream value, composition, or in-
gredients of the product.28
The words "butter, .... creamery," "dairy," or a combination of these
words may not be placed on a package containing an imitation dairy pro-
duct.2" "Renovated butter" or "process butter"3" must be conspicuously
labeled or marked under threat of penalties providing a $50 to $100 fine
for the first offense and $100 to $300 and/or imprisonment for thirty
to sixty days for subsequent offenses.3 ' Packing a superior grade of but-
ter or cheese to conceal an inferior grade by placing the finer grade upon
the surface of the lesser is forbidden.32 The code generally prohibits the
22. CODE § 3715.36.
23. CODE § 3715.99(I) (Supp. 1962).
24. CODE § 3715.30.
25. CODE § 3715.31.
26. CODE 5 3715.29.
27. CODE 55 925.02-.08 (Supp. 1962). The applicable penalty is a $25 to $50 fine for the
first offense, $50 to $100 for the second offense, and $100 to $200 for subsequent offenses.
CODE § 625.99(A).
28. CODE §§ 3717.33, .34. The Code provides a fine of $50 to $200 for the first offense
and $100 to $500 and imprisonment from ten to ninety days for subsequent offenses. CODE 5
3717.99(E).
29. CODE § 3717.36. The penalty for violation of this statute is the same as that for the
above statutes. CODE § 3717.99(E), supra note 28.
30. CODE 5 3717.39.
31. CODE 5 3717.99(M).
32. CODE 5 3717.32. The penalty is contained in CODE § 3717.99 (E). See note 28 supra.
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sale of imitation butter or cheese, unless the substance is distinctly la-
beled.83 The sale84 or serving" of oleomargarine, however, is specifically
prohibited unless identifying placards are displayed. Similarly prohibited
is the serving of individual patties of oleomargarine unless they are mark-
ed with a capital "M."'36
The sale or offering for sale of impure or unwholesome milk is pro-
hibited."7 Furthermore, the sale of milk which has been branded or
labeled falsely either as to grade, quantity, or place where produced or
procured is illegal.38 Different kinds of milk such as skimmed, evaporat-
ed, evaporated skimmed, plain condensed, or sweetened condensed must
be labeled distinctly or stamped as such on its container. 9 Also subject




Every person who packages or sells fresh fruit or vegetables must
mark the container with his name, address, and the weight or numerical
count of the contents, unless the container has been constructed in ac-
cordance with the federal statute on standard containers.4 ' Like require-
ments are imposed on packers of peaches, potatoes, dry onions,42 and ap-
ples.43 Also regulated is the labeling of "soaked" goods.44
33. CODE § 3717.25. The penalty is in CODE § 3717.99(E). See note 28 supra.
34. CODE § 3717.14. The penalty is provided in CODE § 3717.99(E). See note 28 supra.
35. CODE § 3717.15. CODE § 3717.99(E) provides the penalty for violation of this statute.
See note 28 supra.
36. CODE 5 3717.19. The penalty is a fine of $10 to $50. CODE § 3717.99(H).
37. CODE 5 3717.10 (Supp. 1962). The penalty is in CODE § 3717.99 (E). See note 28 supra.
38. CODE § 3717.11.
39. CODE §§ 3717.05, .44-.49. Violation of CODE § 3717.05, the skimmed milk labeling
provision, provides for a $50 to $200 fine for the first offense, $100 to $300 or thirty to sixty
days imprisonment for second offenses, and a fine of $50 and imprisonment of between sixty
and ninety days for subsequent offenses. CODE § 3717.99(B). The violation of any section
in CODE 55 3717.44-.49 is covered in CODE § 3717.99(E). See note 28 supra.
40. CODE 5 3717.54. The penalty provided by CODE § 3717.99 (N) is a fine of $100 to
$500.
41. CODE 5 925.22. A fine of less than $25 for the first offense and $50 to $200 for sub-
sequent offenses is provided. CODE § 925.99(B) (Supp. 1962). The packing of any pack-
age to expose a surface or face which gives a false representation of the contents as to size,
color, or quality of the remaining portion of the package is specifically prohibited. CODE §
925.25. The penalty is provided in CODE § 925.99 (B) (Supp. 1962), supra.
42. CODE § 925.32. The penalty is in CODE § 925.99(B) (Supp. 1962), supra note 41.
43. CODE § 925A2. When the apples do not meet the standards as set forth in CODE §
925.46, CODE § 925.45 requires that these apples be labeled with word "culls." The penalty
for violation of any statute of CODE 55 925.42-A8 calls for a fine of $5 to $25 for the first
offense, $40 to $50 for second offenses, and $100 to $200 for subsequent offenses.
44. CODES 55 3715.18, .19. The penalty for the violation of CODE § 3715.18 is a fine of
$500 to $1000. CODE § 3715.99(E) (Supp. 1962). Violation of CODE § 3715.19 is a
fine of not less than $50. CODE § 3715.99(C) (Supp. 1962).
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Miscellaneous
Throughout the code, various labeling requirements have been en-
acted to regulate such miscellaneous items as bedding," silver or sterling
silver products,46 rebuilt storage batteries,47 binding twine,4 "convict
made" goods,49 and petroleum products."
SALE AND ADVERTISING OF ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES
Since the Ohio Legislature has authorized a state monopoly of the re-
tail liquor market, there are very few regulations dealing with this seg-
ment of the industry. One such statute deals with the power of the
Liquor Control Commission to fix wholesale and retail prices. Of course,
such retail prices must be the same in all state liquor stores.5 Also reg-
ulated is the false or fraudulent making, forging, altering, or counter-
feiting of any wrapper or label of any alcoholic beverage. Moreover, a
wrapper may be used only once.52
A manufacturer is forbidden to assist a wholesaler or retail permit
holder by giving him gifts, loans, property, premiums, rebates, or any
other thing of value.53 Similarly restricted is the assisting of a retailer
by a wholesaler.54 The same statute outlaws credit sales to retailers or
wholesalers of any malt, brewed beverage, or wine manufactured in the
United States. This statute also applies to sales between wholesalers
and retail permit holders.55
Under the newly enacted liquor control laws, the Liquor Control
45. CODE § 3713.05 requires a designation as to the type of material used in the manufac-
turing of bedding, e.g., "mill sweepings" or "secondhand materials." The penalty is a fine
of $25 to $500 and/or imprisonment for not more than six months. CODE § 3713.99.
46. CODE § 1329.26. In order for an article to be marked silver, sterling silver, or solid
silver, it must contain not less than 92 % pure silver. Coin silver must contain not less
than 90% pure silver. CODE § 1329.27. The penalty for violation of either of these statutes
is a fine of not more than $100. CODE § 1329.99(A).
47. CODE § 2911.38 provides its own penalty - a fine not to exceed $50.
48. A label must be attached to the twine describing the kind of material composing the twine
and the weight of the ball or parcel. CODE 5 1329.30. Whoever violates this section may be
fined not less than $1 nor more than $25. CODE § 1329.99(C).
49. Merchandise made by convict labor must be labeled as such. CODE § 1329.31. A fine
of $25 to $50 for the first offense and $50 to $200 for subsequent violations is provided
by statute. CODE § 1329.99(D).
50. CODE §§ 3741.18-.20, .21, .22, .23 (Supp. 1962). The penalty for violation of any one
of these sections is a $100 to $200 fine and/or imprisonment no more than thirty days for the
first offense; subsequent offenses call for a fine of $200 to $500 and/or imprisonment not to
exceed six months.
51. CODE § 4301.10(B) (4) (Supp. 1962).
52. CODE § 4301.61. Violation of this statute carries a heavy penalty of one to ten years im-
prisonment. CODE § 4301.99(E) (Supp. 1962).
53. CODE § 4301.24. See American Wine & Beverage Co. v. Board of Liquor Control, 116
N.E.2d 220 (Ohio Ct. App. 1951), where a wholesaler offered to give a retailer free wine
with his purchase.
54. CODE § 4301.24.
55. Ibid.
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Commission is given full power to regulate all advertising dealing with
alcoholic beverages.56 The statutes, however, specifically permit manu-
facturers or wholesale distributors to furnish inside signs or advertising
to retail permit holders.5"
Strictly prohibited is the use of exclusive contracts whereby any per-
son engaged in the sale of beer or intoxicating liquor agrees to confine
his sales to a particular product of a specified manufacturer or whole-
saler or to give preference to such products. These contracts are void
by statute and may be cause for suspension or revocation of the permit.58
Other restrictions in the liquor area should be carefully noted. Pro-
hibited are sales of liquor to minors,59 intoxicated persons,"0 and habitual
drunkards.61  Sunday sales are similarily restricted. These often-vio-
lated sanctions continually give rise to unfair competition among retail
permit holders.
SALE OF SECURITIES
The Ohio Securities Act,6" while precluding civil liability for non-
compliance with orders, requirements, rules, or regulations made by the
Division of Securities, specifically provides that the act shall not limit or
restrict common-law liabilities, fraud, or deception.64 Since the Ohio
Securities Act carries criminal penalties,65 section 1.16 of the Ohio Re-
vised Code should provide a civil cause of action to persons injured as a
result of a violation of the act.66
LOTTERIES
Lotteries are illegal in Ohio by virtue of both constitutional6 7 and
statutory provisions." Three elements are necessary for a scheme to be
considered a lottery: consideration, chance, and a prize.69
56. CCII OHIO ADVANcH SESS. L REP. 171, 172 (April 17, 1963) (CODE § 4301.03(E)).
57. CODE § 4301.24.
58. Ibid. See 15 W. REs. L. Rv. 183 (1963).
59. CODE § 4301.22(A) (Supp. 1962).
60. CODE § 4301.22 (B) (Supp. 1962).
61. CODE § 4301.22(C) (Supp. 1962).
62. CODE § 4301.22(D) (Supp. 1962).
63. CODE §§ 1707.01-.45. For an excellent discussion of the act see Boesel, Analysis of Ohio
Secaurities Act, 5 W. REs. L. REv. 352 (1954).
64. CODE § 1707A0.
65. CODE § 1707.99 (A) calls for imprisonment of one to five years and/or a fine not to
exceed $5,000.
66. See note 1 supra.
67. OHIo CONST. art. XV, § 6.
68. CODE § 2915.12 (Supp. 1962. A fine of not more than $500 and imprisonment for not
more than six months for the first offense, and a fine of not less than $500 nor more than $1000
and imprisonment not less than one nor more than three years for subsequent offenses is im-
posed.
69. Fisher v. State, 14 Ohio App. 355 (1921).
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Only one Ohio case"° can be found where the use of a lottery was
enjoined. The court did so on the theory that it is permissible to enjoin
the commission of a criminal act when the primary object of the injunc-
tion is the protection of property rights and interests.7
In an excellent article on the use of lotteries to promote business as
an unfair trade practice,72 the author indicated the lack of authority in
Ohio for enjoining the use of lotteries as an unfair trade practice. He
cites cases in other jurisdictions, however, which have enjoined the use
of lotteries to promote business as an unfair trade practice.73 The basic
problem is whether injunctive relief can be granted to enjoin an act
which is criminal in nature. One of the general principles of equity is
that an injunction cannot be used to enforce a criminal statute. How-
ever,
the basis for injunctive relief is not to enjoin violation of a criminal law
but rather to enjoin the use of a method of sales promotion which con-
stitutes an unfair method of competition to the detriment of competitors,
and which may also constitute a violation of a criminal statute.
74
Finally, he states that the only adequate and practicable remedy is that
of injunction. Here also is an excellent situation for the utilization of
section 1.16 of the code to recover damages for an illegal act by a com-
petitor to promote business.75
ATTACKS UPON ANOTHER'S BUSINESS
There is, of course, the usual criminal statute in the code dealing
with libel and slander.76 But like many of the other chapters in the
code, there are no reported cases dealing with the utilization of section




There is a noticeable lack of case law in the utilization of section 1.16
of the Ohio Revised Code as a basis for recovery when violation of any of
70. Shaw & Simpkinson v. Inter-State Say., Loan & Trust Co., 8 Ohio Dec. 510 (Super. Ct.
1898).
71. Ibid.
72. Reda, Lotteries As A Business Promotion, 23 OHIO ST. L.J. 698 (1962).
73. Federal Trade Comm'n v. R. F. Keppel & Bros., 291 U.S. 304 (1934); Jones v. Smith
Oil & Ref. Co., 295 Ill. App. 519, 15 N.E.2d 42 (1938); Glover v. Malloska, 238 Mich.
216, 213 N.W. 107 (1927).
74. Reda, supra note 72, at 703; Renner Brewing Co. v. Rolland, 96 Ohio St. 432, 118 N.E.
118 (1917).
75. See note 1 supra.
76. CODE § 2901.37 (Supp. 1962). The penalty for violation of this statute is a fine not
to exceed $500 and/or imprisonment for not less than one nor more than five years.
77. See CODE 3999.09 (Supp. 1962) for special protection given to insurance companies
in this area.
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